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ABSTRACT

This manual introduces undergraduate students in political science to major types of data and methods for cross-national quantitative analysis. The manual's topic, Conditions for Effective Democracy, was chosen because it incorporates several different kinds of data and illustrates various methodological problems. The data are cross-sectional aggregate data, longitudinal aggregate data, and cross-national attitudinal data taken from a five-nation study. The manual contains 10 exercises. The first four examine a series of journal articles about the social and economic conditions associated with successful democracy. Exercise five introduces longitudinal data from the Minnesota Political Data Archive for analyzing sequential relationships among political, social, and economic variables over extended periods of time. The remaining five exercises involve reanalysis of major research findings concerning the attitudinal characteristics of democratic systems. Students do not need previous training in statistics or methods. The only equipment needed to complete the exercises is a counter-sorter, although a calculator would also be helpful. Staff for the course will need a key punch and reproducer. (Author/AV)

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ED178405

MANUAL

for the

COMPARATIVE POLITICS LABORATORY

Conditions for Effective Democracy

by

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with the assistance of

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

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Political Laboratory Curriculum Project
Department of Political Science
University of Minnesota

SO 012 065

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Summer 1968

Preface

The general purpose of this manual is to introduce intermediate level students to major types of data and methods for cross-national quantitative analysis. To accomplish this purpose, a single general topic was selected around which a set of exercises has been prepared incorporating several different kinds of data and illustrating a number of methodological problems. The general topic is "Conditions for Effective Democracy"; the types of data are cross-sectional aggregate data, longitudinal aggregate data, and cross-sectional attitudinal data taken from the Almond-Verba five-nation study. No doubt some other topic could also have been selected, such as political modernization, political participation, or stability and revolution. But the present topic is of obvious intrinsic interest and does enable us to introduce varied problems connected with cross-national quantitative analysis.

The first four exercises examine a series of articles by Lipset, Cutright, and Neubauer dealing with the social and economic conditions associated with successful democracy. Exercise 5 introduces longitudinal data from the Minnesota Political Data Archive for analyzing sequential relationships among political, social, and economic variables over extended periods of time. The remaining five exercises involve reanalysis of major findings from Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture concerning the attitudinal characteristics of democratic systems. The manual includes a code for the analysis deck used in the last exercises.

Throughout the exercises the emphasis is on substantive findings rather than methodology, but the instructor will find ample ppportunity to elaborate the methodological sections if he desires to do so. Students are not presumed to have had any previous training in statistics or methods. The only equipment needed to complete the exercises is a counter-sorter, although a calculator will also be helpful. Staff for the course will need a key punch and reproducer.

Our expectation is that as students master the materials in the manual they will go on to formulate further problems for analysis. Instructors might provide opportunities for students to write additional exercises of their own using the data that are provided. We have found that such assignments can be among the most interesting and useful. Certainly the exercises as a whole should be regarded as an introduction to quantitative comparative analysis which can be supplemented with a variety of additional materials.

Data from the Banks-Textor Cross-Polity Survey, the Yale Data Program, and the Almond-Verba study were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. As on other occasions the staff of the Consortium has been unfailingly cooperative in responding to our requests. Neither the Consortium nor the original authors are in any way responsible for our use of the data in these exercises. We gladly acknowledge the help of revered colleagues in the Department of Political Sceience in preparing the exercises, especially the editors of the series, William Flanigan and Samuel Krislov.

Certain methodological sections of the exercises were incorporated verbatim from the first manual in this series—"Manual for the Political Behavior Laboratory" by William Flanigan and David RePass with the assistance of John Pierce and Nancy Zingale. Special thanks go to our expert typists, Marilyn Christianson and Gloria Priem, whose patience, skill, and promptness in preparing successive versions of both this manual and the manual on political behavior have greatly aided our efforts. Finally, all these exercises were originally introduced on an experimental basis to classes of undergraduates over a period of several years. The comments, criticisms, and endurance of these students have helped measurably to improve the manual.

Editor's Preface

This manual is the second of a series aimed at bringing to undergraduate teaching the sophistication and the excitement of dealing with genuine research problems, the discovery and examination of data, rather than passive acceptance of conclusions. Members of the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota have been involved in the development of such a program for nearly five years. The first of the series -- on political behavior, written by William Flanigan and David RePass -- was issued in 1967. A revised edition of that effort will be available from Little, Brown and Co. this fall. We expect over the course of the next two years to issue similar -- but individualized -- efforts as follows: community power, Thomas Scott; legislative behavior, Eugene Eidenberg; judicial behavior, Samuel Krislov; international relations, Ellen Pirro; political development, Roger Benjamin; and quantitative methods by Roger Benjamin and William Flanigan. As these are revised for final publication, they will also be published by Little, Brown and Co.

The project itself is supported by the Office of Education and the National Science Foundation. In accordance with the principles of public support, and our own purposes, we are making all materials available without restriction, asking only that credit be given for any use of the materials.

Samuel Krislov
Minneapolis, Minnesota
June 25, 1968

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 1

Definitions and Measures of Democracy

Assigned Reading:

S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" in Polsby, Dentler, and Smith, Politics and Social Life, 1963.

P. Cutright, "National Political Development: Social and Economic Correlates" in Polsby, Dentler, and Smith, Politics and Social Life, 1963.

D. E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," APSR, December, 1967.

A significant development in the study of comparative politics during the past decades has been a broad extension of quantitative analysis. Problems which were previously approached more or less impressionistically are now considered appropriate subjects for the use of quantitative data and accompanying statistical techniques. Such a problem is the general topic for this set of exercises: the conditions for effective democracy. Since the time of Aristotle political thinkers have been interested in the question of what are the social, psychological, and historical conditions under which democratic systems flourish; but only in recent years has the question become a focus for systematic quantitative analysis. In this set of exercises we shall examine some recent studies concerned with this question.

A first requirement in examining the conditions for effective democracy is to agree on a definition of democracy. Since we are interested in quantitative analysis we need a definition that is not only conceptually satisfying but that refers to measurable phenomena. That is, we need an operational definition of democracy. A good operational definition of democracy will identify the basic characteristics that we consider distinctive about democratic systems and will also tell us how these characteristics can be measured. It should be stressed that no matter how conceptually satisfying a particular definition may seem, unless it refers to measurable phenomena—unless it is operational—the definition is inadequate for purposes of quantitative analysis.

No one definition of democracy is universally accepted. On the contrary, many definitions are available, and the particular definition we adopt will have important effects on our findings. In this exercise we will consider alternative definitions of democracy that have been used in three recent studies, and we will notice some implications of adopting one definition or another.

Three studies that classify countries according to measures of democracy are Lipset's "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," Cutright's

"National Political Development," and Neubauer's "Some Conditions of Democracy." However, the measures of democracy are different in each study. These differences will be summarized in Figure 1.1.

(1) How does Lipset define democracy?______________________________

____

____

In Column 1 of Figure 1.1 list the measures that Lipset uses as criteria of democracy.

Figure 1.1. Measures of Democracy in Three Recent Studies

Lipset	Cutright	Neubauer

(2) Are Lipset's criteria in classifying countries good operational measures? Are the grounds for assigning countries into one category or another clear and explicit? Could you replicate Lipset's classification on the basis of the measures and data he provides?____________________

____

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____

Lipset's criteria are intended as measures of democracy. Cutright's Political Development Index, on the other hand, is intended as a measure not of democracy but of development. Yet the items included in the Index refer to similar political characteristics.

(3) What is Cutright's Political Development Index intended to measure?

In Column 2 of Figure 1.1 list the items included in Cutright's Index.

Cutright not only lists a number of items but combines them into an Index on the basis of which countries can be scored and ranked. Notice that Lipset's criteria are used only for classifying countries in dichotomous categories--that is, stable democracies or unstable democracies, and unstable dictatorships or stable dictatorships--while Cutright's Index is used to order countries in terms of their score on a continuous scale. Such an ordering permits additional kinds of analysis that would not be possible with the more simple dichotomous classification.

(4) Do you agree with the weights Cutright assigns in constructing his Index? If not, why not?

(5) Is the Political Development Index a good measure of political development, as Cutright defines it? Is it a good measure of democracy?

Neubauer criticizes Cutright's Index of Political Development as a measure of both development and democracy. In Column 3 of Figure 1.1 list the indicators that Neubauer includes in his Index of Democratic Performance.

(6) How do Neubauer's indicators differ from the items in Cutright's Index?

The importance of the differences in measures summarized in Figure 1.1 becomes apparent when we go on to classify and order countries according to one or another of the suggested sets of measures. The basic question is, to what extent will countries be classified and ordered in the same way if we use different measures of democracy? If the classification and ordering of countries turns out the same in all instances it makes little difference which measures we adopt; but if the classification or ordering of countries differs substantially then the choice of particular measures becomes significant.

The consequences of adopting one set of measures or another can be seen by completing Figures 1.2 and 1.3. Column 1 of Figure 1.2 lists 23 countries as ranked by Neubauer on his Index of Democratic Performance. In Column 2 rank the same 23 countries according to their scores on Cutright's Index of Political Development. Where more than one country has the same score on Cutright's Index consider all those countries as the same ranking and then skip that number to determine the next ranking. (For example, since 8 countries have the highest score, 66, on Cutright's Index, consider all 8 countries as ranked first and then skip to ninth place for the next country.)

Figure 1.2. Ordering of 23 Countries on Indices of Democracy in Two Recent Studies

Neubauer		Cutright	
1	Great Britain		
2	France		
3	Finland		
4	Sweden		
5	Netherlands		
6	Belgium		
7	Japan		
8	Luxembourg		
9	Norway		
10	New Zealand		
11	Denmark		
12	Israel		
13	West Germany		
14	Italy		
15	Canada		
16	United States		
17	Venezuela		
18	Austria		
19	Chile		
20	Ireland		
21	India		
22	Switzerland		
23	Mexico		

Now, in Figure 1.3 plot the location of each of the 23 countries by its position on Cutright's ordering as the vertical axis and Neubauer's ordering as the horizontal axis.

Figure 1.3. Relationship of Cutright's Ordering of Democratic Countries to Neubauer's



(7) If Cutright's and Neubauer's ordering of countries were identical, how would the cases be distributed on Figure 1.3? ____________

____

(8) In fact, how are the cases distributed? ____________________

____

____

(9) How serious is the deviation of the actual distribution from the distribution that would appear if the orderings were identical? ______

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(10) What implications follow from the deviation between the actual distribution of cases and the expected distribution if the orderings were identical?

(11) On the basis of Figure 1.3 what conclusions can you draw about the significance of alternative measures in ordering countries by extent of democracy?

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 2

Some Relationships between Democracy and Levels of Economic and Social Development

Assigned Reading:

S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," in Polsby, Dentler, and Smith, Politics and Social Life, 1963.

One of the most important set of hypotheses about the conditions for effective democracy concerns the relationships between democracy and prevailing levels of social or economic development. Lipset writes, for example, that "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." There are, however, a number of different ways in which the relationships between democracy and development can be described. In this exercise we will begin to examine some of these possible relationships.

In general, Lipset is attempting to show that democratic countries are more highly developed than non-democratic countries. In order to do so he must define democracy, define "level of development," and show how level of development is related to democracy. In Exercise 1 we compared Lipset's definition of democracy with some alternative definitions. We must now see what Lipset means by "level of development" and how he demonstrates a relationship between the two.

Just as there is no single accepted definition of democracy so there is also no single definition of national wealth or level of economic development. Instead, a number of different measures are commonly used either singly or in combination. Lipset himself introduces 15 indicators under four general headings: indices of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. As we shall see, it makes a difference which of these indicators are used in the analysis.

In order to show how democracy and development are related Lipset uses two straightforward statistical measures: means and ranges. Each of these measures allows him to say something different about the relationship. Lipset maintains, first of all, that democratic countries have higher average levels of wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization than non-democratic countries. In his own words: "the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries as the data presented in Table II indicate." It is certainly clear from these data that on every indicator the mean level of development is higher among European and English-speaking countries for stable democracies than for the others, and among Latin-American countries for democracies and unstable dictatorships than for the others. However, as we look again at Table II an additional interpretation also suggests itself; namely, that European and English-speaking countries are more highly developed than Latin-American countries *regardless of degree of democracy*.

(1) On how many indicators is the mean level of development *lower* for the Latin-American democratic category than for the European and English-speaking dictatorship category? ________ On which indicators is the mean level of development higher? ________

(2) In light of your answer to question 1, how would you interpret the data in Lipset's Table II taking into account both the relationship between democracy and development and the relationship between the two regional groups of countries? ______________________________

____

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It seems that the distinction between European and English-speaking countries on one hand and Latin-American countries on the other is quite important in affecting the general relationship between democracy and development.

(3) Why did Lipset distinguish between the two groups of countries in the first place? What are the advantages and disadvantages of treating the two groups separately? ______________________________

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As a statistical measure, the *mean* is one way of describing central tendency or a typical case in any collection of cases. The mean tells us nothing, however, about the *distribution* of cases in the group. For example, two students may have the same mean grade—say 85%—but the first student may have received grades of 70, 75, 95, and 100, while the second received grades of 81, 83, 87, and 89. In the former instance there was actually no "B" grade in the entire collection, but in the latter all the grades were "B". Although the *mean* is the same in both instances, we would certainly interpret the academic performance of the two students very differently. So far as Lipset's analysis is concerned, a description of the relationship between democracy and *mean* level of development may conceal the fact that some democratic countries are actually at low levels of development while some dictatorships are at high levels of development. In order to determine whether or not this is true we need an additional measure besides the mean. Lipset himself provides the *range* as an additional measure.

The range describes the limits of variation or the extremes of cases in the collection. The first of our two students in the preceding paragraph received grades ranging from 70 to 100, while the second student's grades fell within a range of only 8 points. With regard to Lipset's analysis, the range for each indicator shows the extent of overlap in levels of development of democratic countries and dictatorships. The less such overlap exists the more confidence we can have in the relationship between democracy and development; the more such overlap exists the less convincing would the relationship seem to be. Why is this so?____

____

____

(4) On how many indicators is there overlap in levels of development between democracies and dictatorships? ________ On which indicators is there the most and least overlap?____.

____

(5) If we wanted to describe the relationship between democracy and development in terms of ranges in levels of development rather than mean levels of development, how would you interpret the data in Lipset's Table II?

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The range indicates the limits of variation or the extremes of cases in a collection; it does not, however, indicate how the cases are distributed within those limits. Within the same range cases may be concentrated at the extremes, or distributed evenly across the entire range, or concentrated at the mean, or distributed in many other patterns. In order to see how in fact the cases are distributed we must go beyond the range to examine the frequency distribution of cases in the collection. The frequency distribution tells us where cases fall within the range. With regard to Lipset's analysis, the frequency distribution would tell us not only how much overlap exists in levels of development but also how many countries overlap in this way. The fewer countries from different categories that overlap in levels of development the more confidence we can have in the relationship between democracy and development.

In Figures 2.1a-d the frequency distribution is given for Lipset's four categories of countries on four basic indicators, one each for wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. In each figure the vertical axis shows number of countries and the horizontal axis shows level of development on that indicator. The line for each category of countries shows the number of countries at each level of development.

2-4

Figure 2.1a. Frequency Distribution of GNP per Capita,[1] for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries



Figure 2.1b. Frequency Distribution of Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture,[2] for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.1a



Source: Data for the four indicators used in these tables were obtained from the Yale Political Data Program. With minor modifications these data, with explanatory notes, are available in published form in Russett *et al*, *The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, 1964). It should be noted that these are not Lipset's original data, but in most cases are comparable to them.

[1] Our figures are for GNP per capita, 1957, measured in US dollars, while Lipset uses income per capita.

[2] Note that Lipset's figures are for percentage of *males* employed in agriculture.

Figure 2.1c. Frequency Distribution of Percentage Literate of Population Aged 15 and Over, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.1a



Figure 2.1d. Frequency Distribution of Percentage of Population in Cities of Over 20,000 Population, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.1a, except as noted below[1]



[1] Data for one case is lacking in each of the following categories: European and English Speaking Dictatorships; and Latin American Democracies. The Ns for these categories should therefore be 16 and 6, respectively.

(6) On each of the four indicators, find (a) how many European and English-speaking democracies and dictatorships overlap in levels of development; (b) how many Latin-American democracies and dictatorships overlap in levels of development; (c) how many European dictatorships and Latin-American democracies overlap in levels of development. (For simplicity we are referring to Lipset's category of European and English-speaking stable democracies as "democracies" and his second category as "dictatorships"; the same is true of his two categories of Latin-American countries.)

GNP: (a)________; (b)________; (c)________

Agricultural Employment: (a)________; (b)________; (c)________

Education: (a)________; (b)________; (c)________

Urbanization: (a)________; (b)________; (c)________

(7) Does an analysis of the frequency distributions, as compared simply to ranges, seem to strengthen or weaken the alleged relationship between democracy and levels of development? Why?________________________

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____

____

To carry the analysis one step further we can express the data in Figures 2.1a-d as cumulative frequency distributions. This will tell us the per cent of total cases in each category of countries at successive and all preceding levels of development. In Figures 2.2a-d the vertical axes show per cent of countries from 0-100%; the horizontal axes show the level of development on each indicator. Each point on the line represents the per cent of all countries at that and preceding levels of development. For example, in Figure 2.3b we can see that about 70% of all European and English-speaking democracies have 20% or less of their labor force employed in agriculture, and about 90% have 30% or less employed in agriculture; among European and English-speaking dictatorships less than 10% of the countries have 20% or less of their labor force employed in agriculture. To find the amount of overlap in the same Figure we can compare the per cent of European dictatorships at successive levels of development with the per cent of democracies at these levels. In other words, about 40% of European and English-speaking dictatorships are at levels of development that overlap some democracies; 60% are at lower levels of development than all democracies; 8% of European and English-speaking democracies are at higher levels of development than any dictatorship.

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Figure 2.2a. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of GNP per Capita, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries



Figure 2.2b. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agriculture, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.2a



UNIVERSITY BOOKSTORES GRAPH NO. 4 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

Figure 2.2c. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Percentage Literate of Population Aged 15 and Over, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.2a



Figure 2.2d. Cumulative Frequency Distribution of Percentage of Population in Cities of Over 20,000 Population, for Lipset's Four Categories of Countries

Key: Same as Figure 2.2a, except as noted below[1]



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[1] The Ns for the European & English Speaking Dictatorships and Latin American Democracies are 16 and 6, respectively.

Figures 2.2b-d are already completed. Using the data in Figure 2.1a complete Figure 2.2a showing the cumulative frequency distribution of countries in all four categories in terms of GNP per capita.

(8) From Figure 2.2a find (a) the per cent of European and English-speaking democracies at higher levels of development than any comparable dictatorship ________; (b) the per cent of European and English-speaking dictatorships at lower levels of development than any comparable democracy ________; (c) the per cent of European and English-speaking democracies that overlap comparable dictatorships in levels of development; (d) the per cent of European and English-speaking dictatorships that overlap comparable democracies in levels of development ________; (e) the per cent of more democratic Latin-American countries at higher levels of development than any less democratic Latin-American countries ________; (f) the per cent of Latin-American countries in the more democratic category at higher levels of development than any European and English-speaking dictatorships.________.

(9) Do these percentages tend to confirm or refute the alleged relationship between democracy and development? Why?________________________

____

____

____

In Figure 2.3 draw a hypothetical cumulative frequency distribution in which the relationship between democracy and development, as hypothesized by Lipset and as shown through this statistical measure, would be fully confirmed. Let the vertical axis show per cent of countries, and the horizontal axis an imagined single index of social-economic development; use two categories of countries—democracies and dictatorships.

Figure 2.3. Hypothetical Cumulative Frequency Distribution Showing Relationship between Democracy and Level of Development



(10) How convincing is the relationship between democracy and development hypothesized by Lipset on the basis of the analysis you have done in this exercise? To what extent is it true, as Lipset says, that "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy"?

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 3

Correlation of Political and Social-Economic Development

Assigned reading:

Phillips Cutright, National Political Development, in Polsby, Dentler and Smith, Politics and Social Life, pp. 569f.

In this article, Cutright carries the investigation of relationships between democracy and levels of social-economic development beyond Lipset's analysis in three basic ways: first, he constructs a single index for measuring degrees of democracy (political development) in all countries; second, he adopts a single index for measuring levels of social-economic development in all countries; and third, he uses more complex statistical measures of the relationship between democracy and development than simply means and ranges. We have already discussed Cutright's Index of Political Development as a measure of democracy in Exercise 1, and we will return to it again in the next exercise. Here we will examine his index of social-economic development and part of his statistical analysis.

Lipset's study uses 15 indicators of social-economic development under four general headings: wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education. We say that some of these indicators are more highly associated with democracy than others. But Lipset himself does not select any one indicator or index of social-economic development as the major variable in his analysis. Cutright does adopt such an index. His method for doing so is to correlate selected indicators of social-economic development with degree of democracy (political development). Through this method he finds that the indicator which is most highly associated with degree of democracy is the Communications Development Index.

The Communications Development Index was constructed by adding a country's statistically adjusted scores on newspaper consumption, newsprint consumption, telephones, and volume of domestic mail per capita. Scores on this communications index were then correlated with scores on the democracy (political development) index, and the degree of association between communications and democracy was compared to the correlations between democracy and three other social-economic measures--urbanization, education, and agricultural employment. To understand this procedure we must say a few words about the meaning of correlation.

We are dealing here with measures of association or correlation which measure the degree of strength of relationship between two variables. Whenever we say that there is a relationship between two variables we generally mean that they vary together; as the value of one variable increases, the other also increases; as one decreases, the other also decreases. If the two variables were perfectly related, all cases, or data points, for these two variables would fall exactly on a straight line, as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1

In addition it would be possible to predict one variable from the other. For example, if we knew that a country had a score of 2 on variable X, we could predict accurately its score on variable Y (which in Figure 1 would also be 2).

Figure 1 illustrates a perfect positive relationship between two variables. Negative relationships have the same characteristics except that the slope of the line is negative, i.e., it slants in the opposite direction, or put another way, as one variable increases the other decreases. A perfect negative relationship is shown in Figure 2. Again the data points fall on a straight line and, knowing an individual's score on variable X, his score on Y could be accurately predicted. (Note that if we simply reversed the order of the scores of one variable along one axis the sign of the relationship would be reversed.)



Figure 2

Perfect relationships are rare, and virtually non-existant in the social sciences; however, these two notions--predictability and linearity--form the basis of two closely related and very important tools of data analysis, measures of association (or correlation) and regression analysis.

The purpose of regression analysis is to represent the relationship between two (or more) variables in the form of a linear equation which would allow us to predict the scores on the dependent (or Y) variable by knowing the scores on the independent (or X) variable. Thus, in Figure 1, we could write an equation for the line on which all data points fall in the form $Y = a + bX$, in which a is the point at which the line crosses the Y axis and b is the slope of the line. We could then calculate the value of Y associated with the every value of X. (In the case of Figure 1, the equation is $Y = 1 + .5X$; thus, when $X = 4$, the value of Y is $1 + (.5)(4)$ or 3. You should satisfy yourself that the equation holds for every other value of X.)

Whenever a relationship is less than perfect, i.e., when all the data points do not fall exactly on a straight line, we cannot predict scores with complete accuracy. We can, however, make a "best estimate" of these values by knowing the equation of the "best fitting straight line" (technically, the "least squares line," or that line at which the sum of the squared deviations from the line would be at a minimum.) Figure 3 illustrates a hypothetical scattergram of data points with an estimated least squares line drawn in.



Figure 3

The regression equation for the best fitting straight line does not by itself tell us anything about the strength of the relationship between variables. Measures of association or correlation coefficients enable us to estimate this strength by measuring the amount of dispersion of the data points around the best fitting straight line. At the same time, these measures indicate the degree of accuracy with which one variable can be predicted from the other using the regression equation.

Figure 4 illustrates correlations of varying strengths.



4a.
Moderate
Positive
Correlation

4b.
No
Relationship

4c.
Strong
Negative
Correlation

Figure 4

Most measures of association and correlation coefficients have definite upper and lower limits, representing perfect positive and negative relationships. A perfect positive correlation is given a value of +1.0, a perfect negative correlation -1.0. A zero correlation indicates an absence of a relationship, as shown in Figure 4b. The coefficients varying between +1.0 and -1.0 are therefore interpretable: the closer the coefficient approximates +1.0 or -1.0, the stronger the relationship; as the values approach zero (with either positive or negative signs) weaker relationships are indicated.

The best known of the correlational measures is Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient, which is used by Cutright in the assigned article. In order to use this measure correctly, we must assume that the variables we want to use are equal interval scales. In aggregate data analysis we are likely to have such scales (for example, GNP, % literate, etc.), and the use of this coefficient is quite appropriate. In survey research this is less likely to be the case and other measures of association requiring only rank order scales are more suitable.

We can now interpret Table 1 in Cutright's article. This table contains a good deal of information. (1) The means and standard deviations for each variable will not be used in these exercises, but you should be aware that standard deviation is a common measure of dispersion or measure of the degree of homogeniety of a same number of cases on a given variable. The greater the dispersion or spread of score around the means, the larger will be the standard deviation; conversely, if all cases fall close to the mean, the standard deviation will be smaller. Put another way, the larger the standard deviation the greater the heterogeneity of the cases with respect to that variable. In Exercise 2 we used graphs to illustrate the distribution of cases; standard deviation is a summary measure providing the same type of information. (2) The table tells us the degree of association between each variable and political development, and thereby enables us to compare the variables from the standpoint of their value as predictors of political development. The correlation between political development and agricultural employment is -.56 (note that in general the higher the level of agricultural employment the lower the level of economic development); between political development and education the correlation is .62; between political development and urbanization .64; between political development and communication the correlation is .80. Of the four variables, communication is clearly the most highly correlated with political development. (3) The table also tells us the degree of association among all the predicting variables. We see that communication is correlated .71 with urbanization, .85 with education, and -.79 with agriculture. Notice that although communication is highly correlated with education (.85), the value of each variable as a predictor of political development is very different (communication .80, and education only .62). In other words, because two variables are highly correlated with each other it does not follow that they are both equally correlated with a third variable.

On the basis of this statistical analysis Cutright adopts the communications index as the best predictor of political development. In Figure 1 of his article he plots the relationships between communications and political development as a scattergram. This figure gives a graphic representation of where countries are located in three respects: their level of political development, their level of communications, and the direction of deviation between the expected level of political development and the actual level of political development. We see, for example, that Mexico and Italy score about the same on political development, but Italy scores significantly higher on the communications index. This means that political development and communication are not associated to the same degree in both countries, and this difference is depicted in the location of the two countries in relation to the regression line. Mexico is considerably above the line, while Italy is below the line. This means that in view of its relatively low score on communication, Mexico would be expected to score low also on political development, but in fact its level of political development is higher than predicted; while Italy could be expected to score higher in political development than is in fact the case.

Although Cutright adopts level of communications as the best predictor of democracy, he does not directly compare communications with the economic variable which seemed most highly associated with democracy in our examination of Lipset's article: per capita GNP. Following Cutright's general line of analysis, it is appropriate to ask how highly per capita GNP is correlated with democracy and to compare this variable with communications as a predictor of democracy. Table 3.1 presents a matrix of correlations from which such a comparison can be made.

Table 3.1. Matrix of Correlations of Political Development, GNP per Capita, and Level of Communications

	1	2	3	Means	S.D.
1) GNP per Capita		.665	.859	501.1	490.2
2) Political Development	(70)		.739	51.2	9.2
3) Communications	(70)	(71)		207.8	35.9

As in the matrix of correlations presented in Cutright's article, numbers above the diagonal are Pearson's product-moment correlations and those below the diagonal are the number of cases upon which the correlations are based.

Sources: Data on GNP per Capita are from Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Yale University Press, 1964; Scores on Cutright's Indices of Political Development and Communications were extracted from Figure 1 in his article, "National Political Development."

(1) What does Table 3.1 show about the relationships between communication, per capita GNP, and political development? ______________

To present more graphically the relationships between democracy and per capita GNP, we can construct a scattergram similar to Cutright's. The data for such a scattergram are contained in Table 3.2. Complete Figure 3.3 by plotting the location of countries according to the relationship of their political development to per capita GNP.

Table 3.2. Political and Socio-Economic Indicators for 71 Countries Analyzed by Cutright

Country	GNP per Capita	Cutright Political Development Index
Afghanistan	50	42
Argentina	490	52
Australia	1316	65
Austria	670	51
Belgium	1196	58
Bolivia	99	53
Brazil	293	55
Bulgaria	365	46
Burma	57	48
Cambodia	99	35
Canada	1947	66
Ceylon	129	46
Chile	379	66
China	73	43
Colombia	263	55
Costa Rica	357	66
Cuba	431	56
Czechoslovakia	680	48
Denmark	1057	60
Dominican Republic	239	40
Ecuador	189	51
El Salvador	219	53
Finland	794	56
France	943	59

Table 3.2. (Con't.)

Country	GNP per Capita	Cutright Political Development Index
German Federal Republic	927	52
Greece	340	51
Guatemala	189	56
Haiti	105	42
Honduras	194	50
Hungary	490	49
Iceland	572	59
India	73	49
Indonesia	131	47
Iran	108	41
Iraq		44
Ireland	550	66
Israel	726	52
Italy	516	54
Japan	306	54
Jordan	129	35
Korean Republic	144	43
Laos	50	35
Lebanon	362	48
Luxembourg	1388	58
Malaya	356	41
Mexico	262	54
Netherlands	836	57
New Zealand	1310	66
Nicaragua	160	57

Table 3.2. (Con't.)

Country	GNP per Capita	Cutright Political Development Index
Norway	1130	59
Pakistan	70	35
Panama	329	62
Paraguay	114	45
Peru	179	54
Philippines	220	51
Poland	475	45
Portugal	224	35
Rumania	360	46
Saudi Arabia	170	35
Spain	293	35
Sweden	1380	66
Switzerland	1428	66
Thailand	96	40
Turkey	220	50
United Kingdom	1189	66
United States	2577	56
Uruguay	478	62
USSR	600	48
Venezuela	648	50
Vietnam Republic	76	42
Yugoslavia	265	45

Sources: Data on GNP per Capita are from Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, Yale University Press, 1964; scores on Cutright's Indices are from Figure 1 of his article, "National Political Development."

Figure 3.3. Relationship of Political Development to GNP per Capita



Y = 45.3 + .012X

Draw the least squares line in Figure 3.3.

(2) Comparing Figure 3.3 with Cutright's Figure 1, how much similarity and difference is there in the location of countries when we use the alternative variables?

(3) If, as Cutright alleges, level of communications is a better predictor of political development than more common measures of economic well-being, why is the communications index not used more widely?

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 4

Thresholds of Democratic Development

Assignment:

Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," APSR, Vol. LXI, No. 4 (December, 1967), pp. 1002f.

In this article Neubauer raises several important questions about the conclusions reached by Cutright in his analysis of the relationship between political and social-economic development, discussed in the previous exercise. Neubauer first questions Cutright's index of political development; he then attempts to show that with the use of a more appropriate political index the alleged correlation between democracy and social-economic development does not hold in the form described by Cutright.

Throughout the previous exercises we have encountered various "indices" of political development and democracy without, however, considering directly how an index is constructed and used. Since one of Neubauer's main criticisms concerns the use of a particular index, we should understand clearly how indices are employed.

In data analysis we often have information about a series of different but interrelated variables. Cutright, for example, collected data on: (1) the number of parties in the legislative branch of government; (2) the percentage of seats in the legislature held by the minority party or parties; and (3) the means of selection of the chief executive, for each country in his sample over a twenty-two year time span. These variables, used individually, give us three separate indicators of three different aspects of the governmental systems of the countries in the sample. At this level each indicator measures something different, and as such they are not interchangeable or equivalent. We could not, for example, use the number of parties in a political system to indicate directly the closeness of the competition among parties—although we might find in fact that the two phenomena are highly related. At a broader level, however, we might surmise, as Cutright does, that all three indicators also measure a more general dimension of the political system—its level of development—albeit each in a slightly different way. While any single variable might not be a satisfactory indicator of this broader dimension, some combination of the three into one overall measure might be more adequate. For example, we might hesitate to say that a high level of competition among parties indicates a high level of political development in a country if the chief executive is chosen by a military junta, or conversely, that popular election of the chief executive by itself insures high development when only one party has representation in the legislature. Taken together, however, both indicators may seem a more satisfactory measure of the actual development or degree of democracy of the system.

There are a number of methods of varying complexity by which a series of variables can be combined into a single measure. Here we will only be concerned with the simplest of these methods—the index. This is essentially a straightforward assignment of an overall score to each case on the basis of its score on each of the component variables. Cutright, for instance, gives one point for the presence of each of the three variables included in the index. Table 4.1 gives the possible combinations of variables yielding different overall scores for any one year on the Cutright index.

Table 4.1. Constituents of Cutright's Index of Political Development

Score	I	II	III
	Self-governing Parliament with 2 or more parties	Self-governing Parliament with at least 30% minority representation	Popular election of chief executive or selection of chief executive by self-governing Parliament with at least 30% minority representation
3	X	X	X
2	X	X	
2	X		X
(2		X	X)
1	X		
(1		X	)
1			X
0			

(Notice that the two combinations enclosed by brackets in the above table are not really possible on Cutright's index, since his second variable (30% minority representation) is dependent upon the presence of at least two parties in the legislature (Variable I)).

A variation of Cutright's procedure would be to assign different "weights" to different variables. Since Cutright includes two items dealing with the legislature and only one referring to the executive branch of government, we might feel that the latter should be given additional weight in the combined score. Democratic selection of the chief executive might thus be given a weight of 2, yielding an index ranging from 0 to 4. Other weights, and/or the inclusion of additional variables, would provide other alternatives.

It should be noticed that the decisions about which variables to include and what weights to assign to particular variables are left entirely to the analyst in constructing an index. An index has no particular properties which the data must satisfy; the only criteria for an acceptable index are a common sense evaluation of the selection and weighting of the variables included and the usefulness of the index for analysis of the problem at hand. By the same token it must be remembered that indices are essentially arbitrary measuring instruments, and evaluation of the uses of such devices must always take account of the theoretical and conceptual decisions which were made in their construction.

Turning now to Neubauer's Index of Democratic Performance:

(1) How is Neubauer's index constructed?____________________

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____

(2) What are the alleged advantages of Neubauer's index compared to Cutright's?____

____

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____

(3) How would you evaluate Neubauer's criticism of Cutright's index of political development?______________________________

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You have now examined the definitions and indices used by three different scholars. Considering the work of these scholars and their criticisms of each other, how would you construct an index of democracy? In Table 4.2 list the variables you would include in an index of democracy and indicate how you would weight and combine them to form the index.

Table 4.2. Constituents of an Index of Democracy

Variables	Weights

(4) Why did you construct your index in the way you did? What advantages do you find in your index compared to the indices proposed by Lipset, Cutright, and Neubauer?______________________________

____

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____

____

____

Cutright finds that political development and social-economic development are correlated; that is, the two variables were found to vary together in a linear form. Using his own political index Neubauer also finds that democracy and social-economic development are related to each other--but not in a straightforward linear correlation.

Actually, there are many other possible kinds of relationships besides linear ones. Linearity assumes that as one variable increases, the other variable also increases (or decreases in the case of a negative relationship) by a constant amount across all values of the variables. In some cases, however, we might hypothesize that the form of the relationship between the two variables may be different for different values of the variables, i.e., the slope of the line may change at different points along the variable continuum. For example, if we were considering the relationship between political stability and the degree of democracy of political systems, we might hypothesize that authoritarian systems would be very stable—due to repressive measures taken against the population—and very democratic systems would also be stable due to the institutionalized procedures available to the citizenry for influencing policy. It may be in the middle ranges of the continuum of democracy, where regimes are neither repressive enough nor open enough to exact compliance, that the greatest instability occurs. Such a relationship is shown in Figure 4.1.



Figure 4.1

The Pearson's product-moment correlation, which assumes linearity, is not adequate to measure the strength of such non-linear relationships. The straight line best fitting the relationship in Figure 4.1 would run parallel to the X axis with a slope of zero, indicating no relationship between the variables. Obviously, however, a curved line would fit the data points very well and, knowing the equation of such a line, quite accurate prediction of one variable from the other could be made. Measures are available to calculate non-linear correlation coefficients; although these will not be discussed here, one should always keep in mind the possibility of non-linear relationships in analyzing data. Plotting the data points on a scattergram can give a good indication of the shape of a bivariate (two variable) distribution and whether the assumption of linearity and the use of linear correlation measures is appropriate.

Neubauer argues that the linear correlation found by Cutright between his political and social-economic variables does not in fact describe the relationship between democracy and development.

(5) How does Neubauer proceed in refuting Cutright's conclusion?

(6) What criticisms can you suggest of Neubauer's argument as a refutation of Cutright?

Instead of a linear correlation between democracy and development, Neubauer finds a relationship which he calls a "threshold" pattern.

(7) What does Neubauer mean by a threshold? How does a threshold pattern differ from a linear correlation?

(8) On the basis of Neubauer's findings, how should the relationship between democracy and development be described?

(9) What additional studies would you propose to examine further the relationship between democracy and development suggested by Neubauer?

Longitudinal Analysis

Assigned reading:

William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman, "Patterns of Political Development and Democratization: A Quantitative Analysis" (excerpts included in this exercise)

In this paper we propose to examine through the use of varied quantitative measures a central problem in political analysis: the relationships through time between socio-economic variables on one hand and two basic political variables--political development and democratization. Interest in such relationships is hardly novel. In this paper, however, we introduce measures and indices based on quantitative data which have not previously been used and which permit forms of analysis that could not otherwise be applied. The studies of Deutsch, Russet, Lipset, Banks and Textor, and others have made plain the possibilities of comparative quantitative analyses. Almost without exception, however, these studies are cross-sectional in focus rather than historical or longitudinal; that is, they employ data from the contemporary period to make comparisons among units at a particular point-in-time. But although many interesting problems can be investigated through cross-sectional analysis there are other significant problems that can only be studied through longitudinal or time-series analysis. It is this neglected area of longitudinal quantitative analysis that we shall explore in the present study.

The dearth of quantitative longitudinal studies dealing with such obviously dynamic problems as the patterns of political development and democratization has undoubtedly been due less to any question about the possible interest of such studies than to the absence of useable relevant data. The data we shall use have all been collected by the Minnesota Political Data Archive.

Our main purpose is to examine relationships through time between three socio-economic variables--urbanization, education, and economic development--and two basic political variables--political development and democratization. The first problem is to find appropriate measures for each of the political variables.

Political Development: An Index of Governmental Publications

Although the concept of political development is commonplace among students of comparative politics, there is notable disagreement concerning both the meaning of the concept and the indices that are appropriate for measuring levels of development. It seems, however, that one important aspect of political development is the extent to which a government is able to adopt the varied and complex policies that are demanded in every modern community. This ability to adopt complex policies we may term "administrative capacity." A basic premise in the analysis of political development is that not all political systems are equal in administrative capacity; not all governments are equally able to adopt the complex policies that are demanded by influential participants. The administrative capacity of a political system depends on a number of conditions, including the introduction of appropriate institutional structures, the presence of trained and motivated personnel, and the availability of relevant information on which policy-decisions can be based. The first two of these conditions have been discussed often by students of political development. A number of typologies have been constructed based on the institutional characteristics of political systems at different levels of development. Although the institutional characteristics that are usually stressed in such typologies do not refer merely to the administrative capacity of a system, some of these characteristics have a direct connection with the relative ability of different systems to adopt complex policies. However, from the standpoint of quantitative analysis a fundamental difficulty with such typologies is that the institutional characteristics they emphasize are never measured quantitatively. It would be unwarranted to say that institutional characteristics cannot be measured quantitatively; but the fact remains that leading typologists show little inclination toward quantitative measurement.

The most widely-used quantitative measures that bear on the administrative capacity of different political systems concern government employment and government revenues and expenditures. Compilations of political data regularly include figures on the number of government employees as a percentage of population or as a percentage of work force, as well as figures on government revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GNP, or on the ratio of different types of government expenditures. We ourselves have collected considerable data of this kind in historical depth. The difficulty here, however, aside from very serious problems in finding such data over long periods of time, is that the suitability of these measures as indications of administrative capacity is somewhat doubtful. Perhaps more elaborate measures of patterns of government employment and expenditures would yield more satisfactory results. But more elaborate measures are not yet available, and our own attempts to find the data for such measures have not been encouraging.

In place of the familiar measures of government employment, revenue, and expenditures we suggest an alternative indicator of administrative capacity related to the availability within a political system of certain types of information. Specifically, we propose an Index of Governmental Publications based on the volume and kinds of policy-relevant information that is published by the agencies of government. The underlying assumption is that the ability of a government to adopt complex policies is indicated by the volume and kinds of information that the government collects and publishes. Three kinds of information were selected as a basis for constructing the Index: census information; reports on trade and commerce; and government statistics. The volume of these types of information that a government publishes through the years is taken as an indication of administrative capacity and a measure of political development.

In constructing the index we counted the number of serial census reports, trade and commercial reports, and statistical reports published by our 29 governments from 1800 to 1960; the number of such serial publications in every decade was totaled as a score for each country in each decade. There are, however, certain limitations to the data. In the first place, the sources for these data should be the government publications themselves. Scores for each country should be computed directly from the publications issued by governmental agencies. Unfortunately, our limited resources made this procedure impossible. Instead, for the period 1800-1920 we counted the volume of serial governmental publications held in all United States libraries as reported in List of Serial Publication of Foreign Governments and for the period 1920-1960 we counted the volume of serial governmental publications held in selected British libraries as reported in the

London Bibliography of the Social Sciences. The use of these sources rather than the governmental publications themselves introduces certain biases into the data, although the extent of these biases is uncertain. Probably the publications of non-Western governments are underestimated, but more generally we cannot be sure that the volume of publications for any country is completely accurate. For this reason the index presented here is less reliable than we would like. We emphasize, however, that the sources of data for a more reliable index are accessible. With more time and funds the relevant government publications can be examined directly, and a highly reliable index can certainly be constructed.[1]

In the second place, the fact that data for the index were obtained from two separate sources posed the problem of combining the data into a single measure despite discrepancies in the figures reported in the two sources. To solve this difficulty we obtained raw scores for two overlapping decades (1910-1929) and on the basis of this overlap we fitted the more recent data from the London Bibliography to the trend established from our main source, Serial Publications. A conversion ratio for each country was obtained by comparing the two scores for the overlapping decades, and this ratio was used to extrapolate scores from 1930 to 1950.

In the third place, we limited ourselves only to serial governmental publications rather than total governmental publications, and we allowed a maximum score of 10 for each serial publication in each decade even when the number of publications in the series was higher. Moreover, we took no account of differences in the size of publications in particular series; a series of pamphlets was counted equally with a series of voluminous tomes. One result of these decisions is to depress the score for the more developed countries. Again, direct perusal of the relevant publications would enable us to construct a more sensitive and reliable index than has in fact been possible.

No extensive validation of this index was undertaken, but we do have governmental non-military employment data for the United Kingdom and the United States over most of the one hundred and sixty years. To the same degree the proportion of the population in civilian government employment indicates the extent of development, and we would expect a high correlation with the Index of Governmental Publications as another indicator of political development. In this instance we find a simple correlation coefficient of .95 in each country, which gives as much support for the index as we could hope for at the present time.

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[1] Scores for the United States were obtained by going directly to the Department of Commerce Index of Publications and counting exhaustively the number of relevant publications. None of our sources contained enough listings for Lebanon to compute an index. From 1900-1929 the Philippines was scored from the Catalogue of the Library of Congress, since publications for the Philippines were not listed in Serial Publications.

Adequate validation depends on better independent indicators than government employment--indicators we lack at this time.

For present purposes all our countries have been grouped into four categories on the basis of their scores on the Index of Governmental Publications. Summary scores from 0 to 3 were assigned on the following basis:

Score	Range on the Index of Governmental Publications
3	1-50
2	51-150
1	151-250
0	251 and over

Changes in political development based on these summary scores are presented in Table 1. (All Tables are included at the end of the paper.)

The distributions shown in Table 1 reveal four distinct patterns of change in political development.

Pattern A: One set of countries achieves an early high level of political development. These countries include Canada, UK, US France, Italy, USSR, and Spain. All maintain the highest level of development for at least four decades. With two exceptions they show an early and gradual increase in political development. In the case of Italy the pattern of development is somewhat uneven; the pattern for the USSR is both more abrupt as well as obviously uneven in the decades of the revolutions and World War II.

Pattern B: A second set of countries attains a high level of development in the mid-20th century. These countries include India, Japan, and Switzerland. All have moderately high levels of development throughout the 20th century, but they reach the highest level only after World War II.

Pattern C: A third set of countries maintains a moderate level of development for a prolonged period, but they do not sustain the highest level of development. These countries include Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Portugal and South Africa. With three exceptions, the trend of development is smooth. Austria, Germany and Hungary reveal uneven fluctuations in development associated with major political disruptions.

Pattern D: A fourth set of countries remains at a low level of political development with at most moderate increase in the mid-20th century. These countries include Burma, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey.

Although there are important problems in generalizing the Index of Governmental Publications as a measure of political development, the Index seems to us to have sufficient face validity to warrant its use in examining relationships between political development, democratization, and socio-economic variables.

An Index of Democratization

Like political development, the concept of democratization has been defined in different ways by different scholars. But despite the variety of definitions students of democracy tend to emphasize four basic characteristics as distinctive features of democratic political systems. These distinguishing characteristics are electoral or parliamentary succession, political competition, popular electoral participation, and absence of suppression. If measures could be devised for each of these characteristics an Index of Democratization could be constructed based on combinations of the four basic measures. In this section we shall introduce such an index and apply it to our 29 countries.

Democratic Succession

The practices through which political leaders succeed to the principal executive offices are a major aspect of every political system. To describe these practices, however, is not always easy, if only because there may be significant divergence between the formal practices and the actual practices of succession. In describing the processes of succession that are characteristic of democratic systems we found it useful to identify a number of different combinations of formal and actual practices of succession that can prevail in any political system. This variety of formal and actual practices can be described as follows:

formal practices	actual practices
electoral or parliamentary: selection of chief executive official through a general election or through investiture by a legislature	electoral or parliamentary
	managed electoral or parliamentary: manipulation of electoral or parliamentary procedures through varied types of pressure, bribery, etc.
parliamentary monarchy: selection through appointment by a monarch with legislative approval	parliamentary monarchy
institutional support: selection of the chief executive official by a specific group or organization, such as a party, military, or religious organization	institutional support: including, in addition to selection by a party, military, or religious organization, succession as a result of popular uprising and other forms of usurpation
monarchy: selection through inheritance	monarchy
colonial: selection by a colonial power	colonial
no formal practice established: interim period in which there has been as yet no formalization of the process of succession	foreign imposition

On the basis of this general typology of practices of succession we constructed a summary measure for democratic succession to the chief executive offices in terms of the following code:

Index of Democratic Succession

0 democratic: formal succession through elections or parliamentary investiture and actual succession through elections or parliamentary investiture
1 semi-democratic: formal succession through elections or parliamentary investiture and actual succession through manipulation, institutional support, or other non-electoral practices
2 non-democratic: formal succession through non-electoral practices and actual succession through non-electoral practices

The use of this measure involves certain difficulties and has a number of implications in assessing a system as democratic. To begin with, identification of the chief executive official is itself sometimes a matter of judgment. When alternative choices were possible we selected the official or officials who seemed to us to occupy the most critical role in the making of policy. Secondly, decisions as to which practices are actually prevalent in a system can also be controversial. Especially in instances of institutional support or managed elections it is not always easy to identify the actual means of succession. Thirdly, the measure discriminates against systems that are formally democratic but in which actual succession occurs through controlled elections or manipulated parliamentary procedures. In this respect the measure is biased against democratic scores. Moreover, this bias is reinforced by our decision to count the worst score for the decade. In other words, our scoring reflects the failure of democratic succession in a country rather than the typical patterns of succession in that country.

Scores on democratic succession for the 29 countries are shown in Table 2. When a decade passes with no instance of succession, the practice of the previous decade is continued.

Competition

The second measure comprised within our overall Index of Democratization is a measure of political competition. There are many different ways in which political competition can be defined, described, and measured, but in a broad comparative and historical perspective only some rather simple measures seem feasible--at least for the time being. Our measure of political competition is based on two characteristics of the system: the presence in the system of legal opposition parties, and the presence of opposition in a regular important elected legislature. Countries are scored in terms of the combination of these characteristics that are present in any decade, as follows:

Index of Political Competition

0. presence of legal opposition parties and opposition in a regular important elected legislature
1. presence of either legal opposition parties or opposition in a regular important elected legislature
2. presence of neither feature

Like the measure of democratic succession, the use of this measure of political competition has certain implications that should be noticed. In the first place, the presence of opposition parties is treated rather formally. A "party" is regarded as any group that identifies itself as such, and the presence of an opposition party is considered as a matter of legal status without regard to how effective the opposition party may be as a political organization. Secondly, identification of a regular important elected legislature involves some controversial matters of judgment. By "regular" we mean that the legislature has not been convened only for a single or limited number of sessions and that it has not been disrupted during the decade; by "important" we mean that the legislature either selects the chief executive or plays a major role in policy-making; by "elected" we mean that members of the legislature are selected by some broad electorate. The existence of these conditions is obviously in many cases a matter of judgment, especially in regard to whether or not a legislature should be regarded as "important". Thirdly, at least in part the measure of political competition was intended to discriminate between modern democratic and modern totalitarian systems, and it does serve this purpose well enough. However, it appears rather indiscriminate for developing systems in both the 19th and 20th centuries. The measure seems too generous in scoring systems which quite early in their development contain both forms of opposition --party opposition and legislative opposition. It appears that highly undeveloped traditional regimes and highly developed totalitarian regimes are most likely to suppress opposition; all other regimes are likely to permit at least token opposition.

Scores on political competition for the 29 countries are presented in Table 3.

Popular Electoral Participation

A third characteristic of democratic systems is widespread popular participation in the electoral process. Actually, mass electoral participation is also characteristic of developed systems, as contrasted with democratic systems, so that in itself popular participation is no indicator of democracy. To construct an Index of Democratization a measure of electoral participation must be combined with the other measures we have been describing.

To measure electoral participation we have recorded the type of suffrage prevalent in each decade in national elections for the legislature or the presidency, whichever elections were most important in the selection of the chief executive official. These types of suffrage were scored as follows:

0. national elections with universal suffrage (including universal male suffrage as well as minor suffrage requirements such as residence)
1. national elections with moderate restrictions on suffrage
2. national elections with severe restrictions on suffrage
3. no elections

Obviously, the distinction between "moderate" and "severe" restrictions on suffrage is in part a matter of judgment. Moreover, the measure as a whole refers to the effects of formal suffrage requirements rather than actual electoral participation. No doubt there would have been advantages in using turnout as the indicator of electoral participation. But turnout data are extremely difficult to obtain for many countries. Some of the variation in scores for individual countries probably exaggerates fluctuation in actual participation, since the scores reflect an easing and tightening of suffrage requirements which may have had relatively slight impact on turnout in the short run.

Scores on popular participation for the 29 countries are presented in Table 4.

Absence of Suppression

The fourth characteristic of democratic systems is the absence of suppression directed against individuals, groups, or organizations that participate in the political process. To indicate the extent of suppression in a system we have scored instances of suppressive acts in terms of both the degree of coercion and the selectivity of the acts. We assigned scores on the following basis:

Index of Political Suppression

0. no significant political suppression (may include the outlawing of a minor extremist party or media censorship)
1. selective coercive suppression (including individual and group arrests or executions as well as coercive measures against parties or other organizations)
2. widespread electoral suppression (applied to widespread coercion practiced during an election period against opposition individuals, groups, and organizations)
3. general repression (including colonial regimes, generally autocratic regimes, and foreign occupation)
4. civil war conditions
5. severe suppression (applied to police-state and totalitarian regimes)

Since all regimes attempt to maintain order we have not considered governmental responses to riots or uprisings as instances of suppression; rather, we have tried to record more general suppressive practices. We have coded the most suppressive acts for each decade, so the measure is biased toward suppressive scores. Again, therefore, our measure reflects the failures of democratic systems rather than their typical patterns. Several types of suppression are omitted in our measure. We have not recorded acts of suppression by local governmental units when such acts were obviously distinct from the national unit; nor have we recorded acts of suppression carried out by non-governmental organizations, although suppressive acts of this kind could be extremely significant under certain circumstances.

Scores on political suppression for the 29 countries are presented in Table 5.

To construct a general Index of Democratization we combined the four measures of democratic succession, political competition, popular participation, and political suppression into a single comprehensive measure. Scores were assigned to each country for every decade in terms of the following eight-point rankings:

Index of Democratization

0. Succession = formal and actual succession through elections or parliamentary investiture
Competition = presence of legal opposition parties and opposition in a regular important elected legislature
Participation= national elections with universal suffrage
Suppression = no significant political suppression
1. Succession = formally electoral, parliamentary or parliamentary monarchy - actual succession managed or institutional support
Competition = Same as for "0"
Participation= Any national election
Suppression = no widespread electoral suppression or worse
2. Succession = Same as for "1"
Competition = Same as for "0"
Participation= Same as for "1"
Suppression = no general repression or worse
3. Succession = Same as for "1"
Competition = Opposition in regular elected legislature
Participation= Same as for "1"
Suppression = Same as for "2"
4. Succession = Same as for "1"
Competition = Opposition in any elected legislature
Participation= Same as for "1"
Suppression = Same as for "2"
5. Succession = Legitimate succession including colonial and monarchical
Competition = Opposition in any elected legislature or legal opposition party
Participation= Same as for "1"
Suppression = Same as for "2"
6. Succession = Same as for "1"
or
Participation= Same as for "1"
or
Competition = Same as for "5"
7. All other combinations

The combination of four measures--competition, participation, suppression, and democratic succession--yields the scores on democratization shown in Table 6.

Inspection of Table 6 reveals four patterns of democratization.

Pattern I: One set of countries remains consistently democratic virtually without interruption through the entire period. These countries are Canada, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. The major departure from a consistently democratic pattern occurs in the United States during the decade of the Civil War. This results from the high suppression score for civil war conditions under our coding. The fact that only four countries are consistently democratic reflects the severity of our Index of Democratization. The requirements for political competition, including legal opposition parties and opposition in a regular important elected legislature are sufficiently demanding to exclude most countries even during otherwise democratic decades.

Pattern II: A second set of countries remains moderately democratic for a number of decades but never sustains a consistently democratic regime. These countries include Argentina, Chile, France, Germany, Hungary, and Italy. All reveal some unevenness in patterns of democratization. With the exception of Chile all have undergone one or more decades of highly undemocratic disruptions during their development.

Pattern III: A third set of countries is predominantly non-democratic but with some interludes of at least moderate democracy. These countries include Austria, Brazil, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain. Despite considerable variation in specific patterns of democratization among these countries, all revert to highly undemocratic regimes following their most democratic interludes.

Pattern IV: A fourth set of countries remains consistently undemocratic throughout the entire period. These countries are Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines, South Anfrica, Thailand, Turkey, and USSR. The major departure from the consistently undemocratic pattern occurs following World War II, when India, Japan, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Turkey achieve relatively democratic regimes. Within the generally undemocratic pattern three types of regimes can be distinguished: colonial regimes (Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, Philippines--for varying periods of time); traditional authoritarian regimes (Egypt, Japan, Lebanon, Thailand, Turkey, Russia, and South Africa--again for varying periods); and a modern totalitarian regime (USSR).

No doubt exception can be taken to the specific scores for democratization assigned to particular countries in various decades. In part such disagreements may reflect differences in judgment and interpretation. Beyond differences of judgment, however, our code does contain some implicit limitations. Scoring under the code ignores abortive attempts to establish democratic regimes (as in Russia in 1917 or during the European revolutions of 1848) as well as short-lived democratic regimes during a decade of severe suppression or undemocratic suppression (as in Japan in the 1920's). At the same time, other scores may exaggerate the extent of democratization through our effort to record periods of experience witn some democratic institutions and practices under otherwise undemocratic conditions (as in Brazil and Mexico during the early decades). These implicit biases certainly affect our patterns of democratization to some degree, but whatever the effects may be the general acceptability of the findings depends at this stage on face validity.

Social and Economic Variables

Since our main purpose is to examine relationships between political variables and socio-economic variables we must now describe briefly the social and economic measures we propose to use in the analysis: urbanization, education, and agricultural employment.

Urbanization

The simplest of the three measures is urbanization, which is defined as the proportion of the population in cities over 100,000. Population estimates are generally available for all 29 countries throughout the entire period of our study. During earlier periods, when the accuracy of population estimates is most questionable, considerable variation in urbanization figures is quite tolerable, since the proportion of population in cities over 100,000 is so small that large changes in proportions would not influence the overall trend.

The selection of 100,000 as a basis for estimating the population in urban areas was arbitrary, dictated by the greater availability of worldwide data on cities over 100,000 in several almanacs and yearbooks. For most countries our data extend back in time to 1800 or to a point where the unit has no cities over 100,000. However, there are several characteristics of the measure that should be noted. In countries with a small population, the growth of any city over the 100,000 mark causes the measure to jump markedly--the trend appears more jagged than the actual overall growth of the urban areas warrants. In countries with large populations this is no problem. There is also a difficulty in establishing comparability among units because of uncertainty in some data as to whether population figures for cities include the entire urban area or merely the central city.

Agricultural Employment

Agricultural employment is measured by the proportion of the labor force engaged in agriculture. Unfortunately, this measure appears to be subject to some error, particularly in the early periods. During preindustrial and precommercial periods estimates of the proportion of a country's labor force employed in various ways may be quite inaccurate. More accurate estimates generally are available only when industrialization is underway. Not only are estimates of the labor force in agriculture subject to error but estimates of the total labor force are also open to question. Moreover, the reported estimates are not always strictly comparable either within a country or between countries, since practices change in estimating the labor force, particularly with respect to including women, counting rural populations, or counting all males as opposed only to employed males. Nevertheless, this measure remains the best single indicator we have of economic development for all our units over the whole time period.

Education

Our measure of education consists of the number of children in primary education as a proportion of total population. This rather curious way of measuring the level of education in a country is used because of its sensitivity during early periods of development. However, it is not as appropriate for more developed countries. In early periods the measure accurately reflects the low level of investment in education as well as the gradual increase in this investment. But later, as the age distribution of the population shifts, it also responds to the proportional decline of primary school students in the entire population.[2] The accuracy of estimates on primary education is probably fairly good once a government begins reporting such information. However, there are problems with comparability from one unit to the next, especially since non-governmental schools may be included or excluded in various patterns.

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[2] We are working on the possibility of converting a country's score from the primary education index to an index incorporating higher education data as the country reaches an advanced stage of development.

Political Development and Patterns of Democratization

Having introduced our principal measures and indices we can now consider some relationships between the political variables themselves and also between political variables on one hand and socio-economic variables on the other...

Figure 9 shows the average of each social and economic characteristic for all countries grouped according to pattern of democratization.

If we turn now to democratization we find that countries with different patterns of democratization over the last 160 years have quite distinct social and economic characteristics for the same period. As Figure 9 shows, consistently democratic countries have smaller proportions of their labor forces in agriculture, are more urbanized, and have higher proportions of the population in elementary schools. The consistently undemocratic countries show the opposite tendency, with high levels of employment in agriculture throughout, relatively little urbanization until quite recently, and low levels of education until the last two decades. On all three variables the moderately democratic patterns (Group II) fall clearly between the consistently democratic countries and the predominantly undemocratic.

Figure 9. Index of Democratization and Social and Economic Variables.



Group I

Canada
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States

Group II

Argentina
Chile
France
Germany
Hungary
Italy

Group III

Austria
Brazil
Colombia
Czechoslovakia
Portugal
Mexico
Spain

Group IV

Burma
India
Indonesia
Japan
Lebanon
Nigeria
Philippines
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
U.S.S.R.

Table 1. Index of Governmental Publications.

	1800										1900					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina				3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
Austria	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	0	2	2	2	2	1
Brazil	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	0	0
Burma										3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Canada							3	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Colombia				3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	1
Czechoslovakia													2	2	1	1
Egypt	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
France	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany								3	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	
Hungary	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	1	1	1
India	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Indonesia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	0
Italy							2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Japan	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Lebanon	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Mexico	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
Nigeria												3	3	3	2	1
Philippines	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Portugal	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
South Africa												2	2	2	1	1
Spain	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Switzerland					3	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Thailand	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2
Turkey	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1
U.S.S.R.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
United Kingdom	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

Table 2. Index of Democratic Succession.

	1800										1900					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina	2			2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Austria	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	0
Brazil	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
Burma									2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Canada							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Colombia				0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1
Czechoslovakia													0	0	2	2
Egypt	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
France	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Germany								1	1	1	1	1	0	2	2	
Hungary	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2
India	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
Indonesia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Italy							0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	0
Japan	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	2	2	0
Lebanon	2	2	2	2			2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
Mexico	2	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Nigeria												2	2	2	2	2
Philippines	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
Portugal	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
South Africa												0	0	0	0	0
Spain	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2
Switzerland					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Turkey	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0
U.S.S.R.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

Table 3. Index of Political Competition.

Country	1800 00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	1900 00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina	2			2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Austria	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Brazil	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
Burma									2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0
Canada							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia				1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Czechoslovakia													0	0	2	2
Egypt	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	2
France	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany								0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	
Hungary	1	2	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
India	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
Indonesia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
Italy							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
Japan	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
Lebanon	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0
Mexico	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Nigeria												2	1	1	1	0
Philippines	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	0	1	0
Portugal	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
South Africa												0	0	0	0	0
Spain	2	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Switzerland					1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Turkey	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
U.S.S.R.	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
United Kingdom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

Table 4. Index of Popular Electoral Participation.

	1800										1900					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina	3			3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Austria	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brazil	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Burma									3	3	3	3	1	1	1	0
Canada							1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	3	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Colombia				1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
Czechoslovakia													0	0	0	0
Egypt	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0
France	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany								0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	
Hungary	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
India	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	0	0
Indonesia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0
Italy							2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
Japan	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0
Mexico	3	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria												3	3	3	3	0
Philippines	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
South Africa												2	2	2	2	2
Spain	3	0	3	2	2	2	0	2	3	0	0	0	3	0	3	3
Switzerland					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thailand	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	0
Turkey	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	0	0	0	0
U.S.S.R.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	3	0	0	0
United Kingdom	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

Table 5. Index of Political Suppression

	1800										1900					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina	2			2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
Austria	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	5	5	0
Brazil	3	3	3	4	4	1	1	1	1	4	1	2	1	5	5	0
Burma									3	3	3	3	3	1	5	0
Canada							0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	3	4	2	2	2	4	1	0	2	4	0	0	2	1	1	0
Colombia				4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	2	2	0	4	4
Czechoslovakia													1	0	5	5
Egypt	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	5
France	3	3	3	3	4	3	0	4	0	1	1	1	0	1	3	0
Germany								1	1	1	0	1	1	5	5	
Hungary	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	0	0	1	0	5	1	1	5	5
India	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	1	0
Indonesia	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	1
Italy							4	2	2	2	1	1	5	5	5	0
Japan	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	0	3	3	5	1
Lebanon	5	5	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	0	1
Mexico	3	4	4	2	3	4	3	2	2	2	2	4	4	2	0	1
Nigeria												3	3	3	3	1
Philippines	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	1
Portugal	3	3	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	5	1	5	5	5	5
South Africa												3	3	3	3	5
Spain	4	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	1	1	1	1	2	5	5	5
Switzerland					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Thailand	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	5	5
Turkey	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	1	5	5	5	1
U.S.S.R.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	5	5	5	5
United Kingdom	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

Table 6. Index of Democratization.

	1800										1900					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Argentina	7			7	7	6	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	6	6
Austria	7	7	7	7	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	0	6	6	0
Brazil	7	7	6	6	6	3	3	3	3	6	3	3	3	6	6	1
Burma									7	7	7	7	6	5	6	6
Canada							1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chile	7	7	4	3	3	6	3	3	3	6	1	1	2	1	1	0
Colombia				6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	2	2	0	6	6
Czechoslovakia													1	0	6	6
Egypt	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	4	6	6
France	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	0	1	1	1	0	1	6	7
Germany								1	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	
Hungary	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	6	6
India	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	0
Indonesia	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6
Italy							6	2	2	2	1	1	6	6	6	0
Japan	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	1
Lebanon	7	7	7	7			7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	5	1
Mexico	7	7	6	4	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	6	6	3	3	3
Nigeria												7	6	6	6	5
Philippines	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	1
Portugal	7	7	6	6	6	6	3	3	3	3	6	1	6	6	6	6
South Africa												6	6	6	6	6
Spain	7	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	6	6	7	7
Switzerland					3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Thailand	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6
Turkey	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	4	6	6	6	1
U.S.S.R.	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	7	6	6	6
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Blank spaces indicate that the unit was not in existence or was otherwise inappropriate.

All the exercises so far have examined relationships between democracy and development in a static perspective. The underlying assumption has been that democracy depends on the presence at a given period of time of certain favorable social-economic conditions. But although such static or cross-sectional analysis throws important light on the problem of the conditions of effective democracy, some important aspects of the problem can only be studied through dynamic or longitudinal analysis. For example, insofar as stable democracy depends not simply on the presence of certain *levels* of development but on the *sequence* in which particular levels are reached, this temporal sequence can only be discovered through longitudinal or time-series analysis.

Quantitative longitudinal analysis over extended time-periods is uncommon in political science, partly because relevant data are scarce. In this exercise we will examine a paper which presents a preliminary analysis of patterns of political development and democratization during the period 1800-1960.

What are the measures of political development and democratization used by Flanigan and Fogelman? How do these measures differ from those of Lipset, Cutright, and Neubauer? How convincing is the distinction between political development and democratization in light of Neubauer's comments on this point?

How are scores determined for the 29 countries on the measures of political development and democratization? Can the scoring procedures be checked?

On the basis of the scores in Tables 1 and 6 of their paper, Flanigan and Fogelman identify four patterns of political development and four patterns of democratization. How are these patterns determined? Do you agree with this classification of countries into four patterns? What alternative classifications would you suggest?

Having identified different patterns of democratization, the authors examine a number of relationships between democratization and social and economic change. In Figure 9 of their paper they show the relationship between democratization and three social and economic variables: agricultural employment, urbanization, and elementary education.

How is each of these variables defined in the paper? What criticisms can you suggest of these definitions?

What does Figure 9 show about the relationships between democratization and patterns of change in the three social and economic variables? What limitations arise from the authors' use of averages in this figure? What additional measures could be used in further describing these relationships?

How do the kinds of findings derived from Figure 9, based on longitudinal data, differ from the findings in previous exercises based on cross-sectional data?

An interesting type of analysis using longitudinal data is the investigation of sequences of change. The basic assumption is that when and in what order certain changes occur, or the temporal relationships of social and political changes, are as significant as how much change occurs, or simply the magnitude of changes. For our present purposes it is interesting to ask what are the sequences of social and economic changes associated with varying patterns of democratization. We may find that more and less successful democracies become industrialized, urbanized, and politically developed in distinctive temporal patterns, so that we can identify a sequence of changes associated with each group of countries. Data for examining this problem are contained in Table 5.1. The definitions of the variables in Table 5.1 are the same as those used in the Flanigan-Fogelman paper.

Using the data in Table 5.1, complete Figure 5.2 by indicating in the appropriate column the decade during which each country becomes industrialized, urbanized, and politically developed as defined in the Figure. Where the decade seems to be earlier than the first listed date, put a minus sign in front of the date and list the date in the column (i.e. -1890).

Looking at Figure 5.2, what temporal relationships among the variables included in the Figure might be interesting to investigate?

Looking at the time of industrialization and urbanization in the two groups of countries, it appears that there is some difference in the sequence in which these changes occur. One such difference is described in Figure 5.3. In Figure 5.3 we can test to what extent in democratic countries industrialization precedes urbanization. The specific hypothesis is that consistently democratic countries become industrialized at least three decades before they become urbanized. Complete Figure 5.3 by indicating the appropriate number of countries in each cell of the two-by-two table. The top row refers to countries grouped as Pattern I; the bottom row refers to countries grouped as Pattern II. The first column refers to countries which become urbanized at least three decades after they become industrialized; the second column refers to countries in which this temporal sequence does not occur.

Figure 5.3. Sequences of Industrialization and Urbanization in Consistently and Moderately Democratic Countries

	Urbanization at least three decades after industrialization	Absence of industrialization at least three decades prior to urbanization
Pattern I		
Pattern II		

Table 5.1 Political, social, and economic changes in 10 countries, 1800-1950 (see note)

	18										19					
Country	00	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	00	10	20	30	40	50
Pattern I																
Canada																
Urbanization							1	2	3	8	8	15	19	22	23	23
Agricultural Employment								50	51	48	43	37	35	31	28	21
Democratization							1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Govt. Publications							3	3	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom																
Urb.	9	11	14	17	20	22	21	25	29	32	34	37	38	39	44	50
Ag.		35	33	28	22	22	19	15	13	10	9	9	8	6	6	5
Dem.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pub.	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
United States																
Urb.		1	3	4	5	6	8	11	11	16	19	22	26	30	29	29
Ag.			72	71	69	64	59	53	49	43	38	31	27	21	18	13
Dem.	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pub.	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0
Switzerland																
Urb.											11	12	12	16	18	21
Ag.										38	31	27	26	21	21	
Dem.					3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Pub.					3	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	0	0
Pattern II																
France																
Urb.	3	3	3	3	4	5	7	9	10	12	13	14	15	16	16	17
Ag.	75	70	66	63	62	62	54	50	48	45	44	42	41	37	34	30
Dem.	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	6	0	1	1	1	0	1	6	7
Pub.	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Italy																
Urb.	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	9	11	15	17	19	20
Ag.							62	62	57	58	59	55	56	51	47	42
Dem.							6	2	2	2	1	1	6	6	6	0
Pub.							2	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Argentina																
Urb.								10	14	16	20	23	25	28	32	38
Ag.								67	63	59	53	45	38	32	26	25
Dem.	7			7	7	6	2	2	2	2	2	0	1	2	6	6
Pub.				3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	0	0
Chile																
Urb.							2	5	8	12	15	16	19	21	23	28
Ag.													37	35	36	31
Dem.	7	7	4	3	3	6	3	3	3	6	1	1	2	1	1	0
Pub.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	1	1	1
Germany																
Urb.	1	1	1	1	1	2	4	6	8	12	16	21	26	29	30	27
Ag.									42	38	35	33	31	30	27	23
Dem.								1	1	1	1	1	1	6	7	
Pub.								3	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	
Hungary																
Urb.						2	2	2	3	3	5	6	14	18	19	21
Ag.									62	60	59	56	58	54	50	51
Dem.	6	7	6	6	6	6	6	1	1	1	1	6	1	1	6	6
Pub.	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	3	2	1	1	1

Note: Numbers for urbanization and agricultural employment are percentages as defined in the Flanigan-Fogelman paper. Scores for democratization and government publications are taken from Tables 1 and 6 of the paper. All data have been collected by the Minnesota Political Data Archive.

Figure 5.2. Times of Industrialization, Urbanization, Political Development and Democratization of Consistently and Moderately Democratic Countries

	Time of Industrialization (first decade with 50% or less of labor force in agriculture)	Time of Urbanization (first decade with 20% or more of pop. in cities over 100,000)	Time of Political Development (first decade with a score of "0" on the Index of Govt. Publications)	Time of Democratization (first decade with a score of "1" or "0" on the index of Democratization)
Country				
Pattern I				
Canada				
United Kingdom				
United States				
Switzerland				
Pattern II				
France				
Italy				
Argentina				
Chile				
Germany				
Hungary				

What does Figure 5.3 indicate concerning the temporal sequence of industrialization and urbanization in relation to successful democracy? What limitations in the data and the analysis might affect the validity of these findings?

Another sequential relationship suggested by the data in Table 5.2 is between democratization and political development. A general observation seems to be that democracy precedes development. Specifically, it appears that consistently democratic countries become democratic at least seven decades before they become developed. This relationship is examined in Figure 5.4. Complete Figure 5.4 in the same way as Figure 5.3, with the first column referring to countries which become politically developed at least seven decades after they become democratic according to the definitions in Table 5.1.

Figure 5.4. Sequences of Democratization and Political Development in Consistently and Moderately Democratic Countries

	Democratization at least seven decades prior to pol. development	Absence of democratization at least seven decades prior to pol. development
Pattern I		
Pattern II		

What does Figure 5.4 indicate concerning the temporal sequence of democratization and urbanization in relation to successful democracy? What limitations in the data and the analysis might affect the validity of these findings?

What additional kinds of analysis can you suggest utilizing the data presented in Figure 5.1?____

EXERCISE 6

An Introduction to Cross-National Survey Research

Assigned Reading:

Survey Research Center, "Surveys, Samples, and Coding," in E. Dreyer and W. Rosenbaum (eds.), Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966), pp. 57-67.

Myron Weiner, "Political Interviewing" and Frank Bonilla, "Survey Techniques," in Robert Ward (ed.), Studying Politics Abroad (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1963), Appendices A, B, C.

So far we have examined two general kinds of conditions that are associated with effective democracy: levels of social and economic development; and patterns or sequences of developments through time. Now we turn to another kind of condition--prevailing political attitudes. The general hypothesis here is that democratic systems are related to certain widely shared favorable political attitudes, termed by Almond and Verba a "Civic Culture."

In turning attention from social and economic conditions to attitudes we encounter a new set of methodological problems. Social and economic conditions are measured by various kinds of aggregate data collected by government, university, and private researchers. But until recent decades no methods existed for systematic measurement of attitudes, so that discussions of attitudes were unavoidably impressionistic. Within the last twenty years, however, major new methods have been introduced that make it possible to measure attitudes systematically. The method we shall emphasize for present purposes is the sample survey.

With a few notable exceptions, surveys have been conducted mainly within single nations rather than across several nations. The data we shall use in these exercises are taken from Almond and Verba's pioneering cross-national survey of five nations reported in The Civic Culture. Actually, the application of survey research on a cross-national basis raises a number of special difficulties beyond those connected with surveys within single nations. Some of these difficulties are discussed in the chapters of Ward's book.

1) What are the different bases upon which samples are drawn in conducting a survey? ____

2) How were the samples in the Almond-Verba survey selected? Are the samples comparable in all five countries?

3) What effects might the variations in samples within the different countries be expected to have on the findings?

4) What major distinctive problems arise in conducting cross-national surveys in contrast to surveys within a single nation?

5) To what extent do the selection of samples and the interview schedules in the Almond-Verba study reflect awareness of these difficulties? ________

EXERCISE 7

About Data Processing and the Interpretation of Tables

Assigned Reading:
K. Janda, Data Processing (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1965).
Visit to data processing facilities.

To complete the next exercises you will make use of some simple data processing equipment for sorting and counting the responses punched on your deck of IBM cards. The use of punch-cards and data processing equipment makes it possible to manipulate large quantities of data very rapidly. For this reason such equipment has become widely used in social science research. As part of this week's assignment you will visit the data processing center and learn to operate the equipment you need.

In the following exercises you will calculate percentages and enter the figures in the empty tables provided. At that point you will face the problem of describing or "talking about" the presentation of data. And since the correct presentation of data in tables and appropriate description are frequently difficult for students unfamiliar with quantitative analysis, we will discuss several examples of tables and description of the information contained in them. Basically we must express quantitative data in the tables and translate the data into verbal statements. First, we will discuss the correct form of table construction and second, we will take up the appropriate verbal statements for interpreting tables. In subsequent exercises many of the characteristics of the tables will be determined for you, but you will constantly have to interpret data in the tables and make statements about the meaning of the data and the relationships they represent.

The table below is one which you will encounter in slightly different form later on in Exercise 9. Here it will be used to introduce you to the proper presentation and interpretation of data in percentage tables.

Table 9.2.--The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High and Low Education Levels in the United Kingdom

Democratic Attitudes Index	High Education	Low Education
High	36%	22%
Medium	43	48
Low	20	29
No Answer	1	2
Total	100%	101%
Number of Cases	370	593

First, we should notice some minor points of style.

1) Table number--this is the second table in chapter (or exercise) nine.

2) Title--the title states that the table presents a relationship between two variables. The two variables are fully and accurately labeled.

3) Percentages--the distributions are in percentages with the total percentage indicated to show that the distributions run down and not across. The percentage sign appears correctly with only the first percentage in each column and again with the total.

4) Number of cases--the number of cases for each column appear under the total percentage so the reader can assess the relative importance of the column and the relative significance of the distributions.

A great many statements could be made about the distributions in Table 9.2 and we will only illustrate the various possibilities not exhaust them:

I. A comparison of the relative frequency of individuals with highly democratic attitudes among those with higher and low education levels:

"Thirty-six per cent of highly educated individuals in the United kingdom had highly democratic attitudes, while twenty-two per cent of those with low education had highly democratic attitudes."

(or)

"Highly educated people in the United Kingdom are more likely to score highly on the democratic attitudes index than are less educated people."

II. A comparison of democratic attitudes within columns:

> "Among highly educated people in the United Kingdom, more had high scores on the democratic attitude index than had low scores."
>
> (or)
>
> "Among individuals with a low level of education in the United Kingdom, 22% had highly democratic attitudes and 29% had low democratic attitudes."

Since the percentages are computed for educational categories, the statements are made in terms of the attitudes or behavior of these educational groups. We cannot say on the basis of the percentages in Table 9.2 that highly democratic individuals are more likely to have high levels of education than low levels. We cannot make this statement on the basis of Table 9.2 because we would have to know the percentage of the total number of highly democratic individuals who have high and low levels of education, information which is not contained in the table. Whenever we make statements involving percentages or proportions, we must remember that these percentages are based on the total number of individuals in some specific group and they cannot be used to refer to any other group. In Table 9.2, the percentages are calculated on the basis of the numbers of individuals who have high and low levels of education, not on the basis of the numbers of individuals with varying levels of democratic attitudes. Therefore, while we can say that 36 per cent of the highly educated individuals have highly democratic attitudes, we cannot say that 36 per cent was calculated on the basis of the 370 highly educated individuals in the sample, not on the basis of all highly democratic individuals, a figure we do not know from looking at Table 9.2.

The most common error in the interpretation of tables is comparison of percentages which are not comparable.

Although all the tables in the following exercises will be similar in format to Table 9.2, you are likely to encounter other ways of presenting data in your readings. Table 7, taken from The Civic Culture by Almond and Verba, is another common method of presentation.

Notice that in Table 7 only the percentage saying that they could do something about an unjust local law is given. Not shown are the percentages who said they could do nothing, and who "didn't know" or who gave no answer.

TABLE 7

Per Cent who say they Can Do Something about an Unjust Local Law, by Sex

Nation	Total (%)	Total (No.)*	Male (%)	Male (No.)	Female (%)	Female (No.)
United States	77	(970)	80	(455)	74	(515)
Great Britain	78	(963)	83	(460)	73	(503)
Germany	62	(955)	72	(449)	53	(506)
Italy	51	(995)	62	(471)	47	(524)
Mexico	53	(1,007)	62	(355)	46	(652)

*Numbers in parentheses refer to bases upon which percentages are calculated.

The most important relationship in Table 7 can be stated in this way:

> "Within each nation, men were more likely than women to say they could do something about an unjust local law."

(or)

> "Higher percentages of respondents in the United States and Great Britain said they could do something about an unjust local law than in Germany, Italy or Mexico."

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 8

The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes

Assignment:
Codebook in this Manual

The data from Almond and Verba's survey enable us, first of all, to describe how democratic attitudes are distributed in five countries. In order to do so, however, we must agree on a definition of "democratic attitudes" and decide which responses to use as indicators of democratic attitudes. For purposes of these exercises "democratic attitudes" refer to attitudes favorable to democracy as a type of political system rather than attitudes about the extent of democracy in the respondent's own country. Two items from the Almond-Verba survey have been combined into a simple index of democratic attitudes. In your codebook this index is the first item for each country (items 1, 17, 33, 49, 65).

(1) How was the democratic attitude index constructed? Is the index a satisfactory measure of "democratic attitudes" as we have defined them above?

____

____

____

(2) What other items in the Almond-Verba survey might have been used as indicators of democratic attitudes? If you were drafting a questionnaire, what additional items would you include to measure democratic attitudes?____________

____

____

Using our democratic attitude index we shall see, in Tables 8.1a-b, how democratic attitudes are distributed in five countries. In Table 8.1a enter the number of responses for each score on the democratic attitude item for each country; in Table 8.1b enter the per cent of responses for each score.

(3) What do the data presented in Table 8.1b tell us about the distribution of democratic attitudes in the five countries?______________________________

____

____

____

____

Table 8.1a. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes, by Country, Raw Frequencies Only

Democratic Attitude Index	United Kingdom 1/	United States 17/	Germany 33/	Italy 49/	Mexico 65/
High /1					
/2					
/3					
/4					
Low /5					
No answer /9					
Total					

Table 8.1b. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes, by Country, Percentages

Democratic Attitude Index	United Kingdom	United States	Germany	Italy	Mexico
High /1					
/2					
/3					
/4					
Low /5					
No Answer /9					
Total					
N =					

It is interesting to compare a ranking of countries according to the prevalence of democratic attitudes with a ranking according to institutional characteristics. Column 1 of Table 8.2 lists the five countries in the Almond-Verba study as ranked by Neubauer on his index of democratic performance; in column 2 rank these countries according to the prevalence of democratic attitudes, as indicated in Table 8.1b. Note that you will need to decide on what basis to rank the countries in column 2.

Table 8.2. Comparison of Rankings of Five Countries According to Indices of Democratic Performance and Democratic Attitudes

Ranking of Countries on Neubauer's Index of Democratic Performance	Ranking of Countries on Index of Democratic Attitudes
Great Britain	
West Germany	
Italy	
United States	
Mexico	

(4) How did you decide on your ranking of countries in column 2?________

____

____

(5) How much agreement is there between the two rankings?______________

____

Divergence between the two rankings could occur for either methodological or theoretical reasons.

(6) What methodological reasons might account for the divergence in rankings?____

____

____

____

____

On theoretical grounds, whether or not the two rankings are identical depends on the nature of the relationship between attitudes and institutions or activity.

(7) What theoretical reasons might lead you to expect agreement between the two rankings? What theoretical reasons might account for divergence in the rankings?____

____

____

____

____

Comparative Politics Laboratory

ASSIGNMENT 9

Social Distribution of Democratic Attitudes

Assignment:
Almond and Verba, Chapter 13.

Data from the Almond-Verba study enable you not only to describe how democratic attitudes are distributed in different countries but also to show relationships between democratic attitudes and a number of social variables that may affect these attitudes. For example, we can ask to what extent do people who are more or less democratic in their attitudes vary in their level of income, amount of education, and place of residence. In order to answer this question we shall first show relationships between democratic attitudes and these three social variables in each of the five countries; we shall then show the same relationships without controlling for country.

In the following tables, we will distribute for level of income (Table 9.1), level of education (Table 9.2), and degree of urbanization (Table 9.3) with respect to scores on the democratic attitude index in each of the five countries. Notice that for each variable we introduce the categories high, medium, low. Definitions of these categories are indicated on the tables themselves. However, other definitions could have been used which would have altered the results to some extent. Most of the tables are already completed; fill in the remaining entries.

(1) How will you proceed in completing the tables?____________________

____

____

(2) Looking at the tables, which of the three variables seems most strongly associated with democratic attitudes? Which of the variables seems least associated with democratic attitudes? How much variation is there between the patterns of association in different countries?____________________

____

____

____

____

Table 9.1. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium and Low Income Levels, by Country

Democratic Attitude Index 1/, 17/, 33/, 49/, 65/	United Kingdom Income 13/			United States Income 29/			Germany Income 45/			Italy Income 61/			Mexico Income 77/		
	High /8,9, -,0	Med /6,7	Low /4,5	High /8,9, 0,-	Med /6,7	Low /4,5	High /8,9, -,0	Med /6,7	Low /4,5	High /8,9, -,0	Med /6,7	Low /4,5	High /8,9, -,0	Med /6,7	Low /4,5
High /1	34%	25%	17%				21%	15%	15%	24%	25%	11%	15%	18%	12%
/2	8	5	7				9	15	9	8	15	17	3	4	7
/3	42	45	46				36	29	26	40	32	30	51	56	47
/4	5	6	8				13	18	20	10	9	14	7	3	6
Low /5	10	19	21				15	14	7	13	15	14	25	17	24
No Answer /9	-	1	1				7	10	23	5	5	14	-	1	3
Total	99%	101%	100%				101%	101%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	99%	101%
N =	59	362	492				322	368	119	62	253	226	106	292	765

Table 9.2. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High and Low Education Levels, by Country

	United Kingdom		United States		Germany		Italy		Mexico	
	Education 11/		Education 27/		Education 43/		Education 59/		Education 75/	
Democratic Attitude Index 1/, 17/, 33/, 49/, 65/	High /9,0, -	Low /7,8	High /4,5, 6,7	Low /0,1, 2,3	High /9,0, -	Low /7,8	High /8,9, 0,-	Low /6,7	High /9,0	Low /7,8
High /1	30%	16%	48%	27%			23%	11%	24%	12%
/2	6	6	7	7			13	12	6	7
/3	43	48	35	40			35	23	46	49
/4	7	7	1	7			10	16	3	7
Low /5	13	22	6	14			14	21	19	22
No Answer /9	1	2	2	4			5	16	2	4
Total	100%	101%	99%	99%			100%	99%	100%	101%
N =	370	593	631	339			303	692	195	1095

Table 9.3. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium, and Low Community Size, by Country

	United Kingdom			United States			Germany			Italy			Mexico		
	Comm. Size 12/			Comm. Size 28/			Comm. Size 44/			Comm. Size 60/			Comm. Size 76/		
Democratic Attitude Index 1/, 17/, 33/, 49/, 65/	High /+,-	Med /9,0	Low /8	High /+.-	Med /8,9, 0	Low /7	High /+,-	Med /9,0	Low /8	High /+,-	Med /9,0	Low /8	High /+,-	Med /9,0	Low
High /1	20%	24%	19%	42%	42%	40%	15%	17%	18%				15%	10%	
/2	5	7	8	7	7	8	13	13	12				6	8	
/3	47	41	48	39	35	34	31	32	28				50	43	
/4	8	4	8	[illegible]	3	5	17	11	19				6	7	
Low /5	19	22	16	7	10	11	15	16	8				20	26	
No Answer /9	1	1	2	2	4	2	9	11	15				3	5	
Total	100%	99%	101%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%				100%	99%	
N =	489	234	240	481	193	296	363	238	354				1011	284	0

I

(3) What further statements can you make about relationships between democratic attitudes and social variables on the basis of these tables?______

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The relationships between democratic attitudes and social variables presented in Tables 9.1-9.3 are all relationships within particular countries. For example, we can say that 34% of Americans with high incomes have highly democratic attitudes, while 15% of Mexicans with high incomes have highly democratic attitudes. From these tables we cannot determine the general relationships between democratic attitudes and differences of income, education, or community-size regardless of the specific country. We cannot say that, in general, X% of people with high incomes have highly democratic attitudes. In other words, in Tables 9.1-9.3 we are in fact controlling for the effects of nationality upon the relationships between democratic attitudes and the social variables. Rather than examine all the cases as one undifferentiated group, we have broken down the group into five separate sub-groups of cases and then examined relationships only within these sub-groups. This prior differentiation of cases according to some variable—such as country—is what we mean by controlling for the variable.

In general, we control for a variable when we suspect that it is associated with one or both of the other variables being examined and thus may have some effect on the distributions found. For example, we found in Exercise 8 that a greater proportion of the United States sample had high scores on the democratic attitude index than did the respondents in other countries. At the same time, we know that Americans enjoy a relatively high standard of living. Therefore, if we were to find a high relationship between income and democratic attitudes without controlling for country, it may be that such a relationship actually exists, or it may be that American respondents are contributing disproportionately to our high income category. Unless we control for country, we might be describing the attitudes of "high income Americans" rather than those of "high income individuals in general," which is our primary objective.

Generally there are three results from using controls in the analysis of quantitative data. First, a control variable may increase the magnitude of relationship between two variables. Second, a control variable may reduce the relationship between two variables to insignificance, i.e., eliminate an apparently interesting relationship. Third, a control variable may not alter the magnitude of relationship at all and demonstrate its insignificance as a variable in the overall pattern.

The usefulness and desirability of controlling for other factors is limited by several practical considerations. For one thing, the verbal description of the relationships in a table with only one or two factors controlled becomes extremely complicated and difficult to grasp. In practice when we control relationships, we concentrate on subparts of the distributions generated and usually do not attempt a statement of the overall relationship. A second limitation is the decreasing number of cases in each cell of the table as we increase the number of controlled factors. This is a problem because percentages become less reliable as the number of cases on which they are based becomes smaller. Generally we do not compute percentages for distributions with fewer than twenty cases. The advantages of controlling are lost if we end up with very few cases in the cells we want to compare under controlled conditions.

In Tables 9.4-9.6 the control for country has been removed, so that we can examine the general relationships between democratic attitudes and differences in income, education, and community size for all cases regardless of the nationality of the respondents.

(4) How do the distributions in Tables 9.4-9.6 compare to the distributions you found in Tables 9.1-9.3, which included the control for country? How do the uncontrolled distributions differ from the distributions in each country?____

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(5) What effect do you think the absence of rural Mexicans in the sample has on the relationship between community size and democratic attitudes?

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(6) How much effect does difference in country have upon the relationship between democratic attitudes and each of the social variables?_________

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Table 9.4. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium, and Low Income Levels, without Controls for Country

Democratic Attitude Index	High Income	Medium Income	Low Income
High /1	34%	24%	15%
/2	7	9	8
/3	37	40	42
/4	7	8	9
Low /5	12	15	20
No Answer /9	3	4	6
Total	100%	100%	100%
N =	1015	1591	1772

Table 9.5. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High and Low Education Levels, without Controls for Country

Democratic Attitude Index	High Education	Low Education
High /1	35%	15%
/2	8	9
/3	37	39
/4	5	11
Low /5	12	19
No Answer /9	2	8
Total	99%	101%
N =	1653	3511

Table 9.6. The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium, and Low Community Size, without Controls for Country

Democratic Attitude Index	High Comm. Size	Medium Comm. Size	Low Comm. Size
High /1	21%	19%	24%
/2	8	9	11
/3	42	35	33
/4	8	9	12
Low /5	17	20	12
No Answer /9	5	8	8
Total	101%	100%	100%
N =	2582	1382	1214

EXERCISE 10

Distribution of Democratic Attitudes According to Socialization and Psychology

Assigned Reading:
Almond and Verba, Chapter 12.
Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization.

In the previous exercise we examined relationships between democratic attitudes and income, education, and urbanization. In this exercise we shall consider relationships between democratic attitudes and two additional variables--socialization, and a psychological dimension. The importance of each of these variables is suggested by significant bodies of social theory, which are reflected in the Almond-Verba study.

1) What do Almond and Verba mean by political socialization? Why is political socialization considered an important concept in political analysis?

The measure of socialization we shall use in this exercise is the third item for each country (items 3, 19, 35, 51, 67).

2) How was the index of socialization constructed?

Notice that the measure we are using refers to family and school experiences, experiences that occur relatively early in life. Use of this measure implies that socialization occurs relatively early in life and does not continue as an ongoing process throughout a person's later years.

3) Is this implication consistent with the definition of socialization in question 1)? ____________________

4) What other items might be included in an index of socialization that would reflect a broader definition of socialization as a process that continues beyond the early years? ____________________

Table 10.1 shows the relationships between democratic attitudes and socialization in the five countries. **Complete Table 10.1.**

5) Looking at Table 10.1, what statements can you make about the effects of socialization on democratic attitudes? ____________________

One body of social theory stresses the connection between political attitudes and socialization; another body of theory stresses the connection between political attitudes and characteristics of personality. To examine relationships between democratic attitudes and characteristics of personality, we shall use a psychological measure which is the fourth item for each country (items 4, 20, 36, 52, 68).

6) How was the psychological index constructed? What characteristics of personality does it measure? ____________________

TABLE 10.1.--The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium, and Low Levels of Democratic Socialization, by Country

Democratic Attitude Index 1/,17/,33/,49/,65/	United Kingdom 3/			United States 19/			Germany 35/			Italy 51/			Mexico 67/		
	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5
High /1	30%	21%	14%				19%	20%	14%				23%	15%	11%
/2	6	5	7				13	13	12				6	7	7
/3	46	44	48				36	30	29				53	51	45
/4	4	9	6				9	16	19				3	4	8
Low /5	12	20	23				13	15	11				12	22	25
No Answer /9	1	*	2				9	7	14				2	1	5
Total	99%	99%	100%				99%	101%	99%				99%	100%	101%
N =	277	350	328				173	305	444				228	332	709

*Less than .5%

Table 10.2 shows the relationships between democratic attitudes and the psychological dimension in the five countries. **Complete Table 10.2.**

7) On the basis of Table 10.2, what statements can you make about the effects of the psychological variable on democratic attitudes? ____________

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So far all your statements about the relationships between democratic attitudes and other variables have been based simply on an inspection of the tables; no attempt has been made to introduce more rigorous statistical measures of association. It would be interesting, however, to compare the degrees of association between democratic attitudes and each of the independent variables discussed in the last two exercises using a more rigorous measure of association.

The best known of the correlational measures is Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient, which was discussed in Exercise 3. In order to use this technique correctly, we must assume that the variables we want to correlate are measured by interval scales, that is, that there are equal intervals or distances between the units of the scale. Much of the aggregate data used in political science research can qualify as interval scale data; we are usually quite willing to say, for example, that the difference between a per capita GNP of $500 and one of $550 is equal to the difference between $150 and $200 GNP per capita. For these types of variables, use of the product-moment correlation to measure strengths of association is appropriate. Only rarely in survey research, however, are we able to measure variables with the precision required for an interval scale. For example, we would hesitate to assume that the difference between a score of 1 and a score of 3 on our democratic attitudes index represents the same difference as that between the scores 3 and 5--the questions on which the index is based may not be of comparable difficulty, cutting points dichotomizing positive and negative responses may not be precise, and so on. Although we usually do not wish to assume an interval scale with this type of survey data, we often feel safe in ranking scores. That is, we can say that a score is higher or lower than another score, though we do not know how much higher or lower. Other measures of association have been developed to handle this type of ordinal scale or rank order data. One such measure is Kendall's tau beta, which we will use below to summarize the relationships which have previously been presented only in percentage tables.

Tau beta is well suited to the type of data available to political scientists not only because it can be used with rank order data, but also because it takes into account tied scores. Since we generally divide our variables

TABLE 10.2.--The Distribution of Democratic Attitudes for High, Medium and Low Levels of Trust, by Country

Democratic Attitude Index 1/,17/,33/,49/,65/	United Kingdom 4/			United States 20/			Germany 36/			Italy 52/			Mexico 68/		
	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5	High /1,2	Med /3	Low /4,5
High /1				55%	45%	30%	28%	24%	15%	26%	24%	14%			
/2				8	8	7	13	15	12	26	9	13			
/3				30	38	41	37	27	31	24	40	27			
/4				2	2	5	13	16	17	8	5	15			
Low /5				4	5	14	3	12	14	11	18	20			
No Answer /9				1	2	3	6	7	11	5	4	11			
Total				100%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%			
N =				310	188	470	78	101	754	38	78	840			

into relatively few categories--for example, "high," "medium," and "low"--we usually have large numbers of "ties" in scores. (For instance, in Table 10.1, 277 British respondents scored "high" on the socialization index; they therefore have "tied scores" on that variable.) Tau beta measures the degree to which a high rank on one variable is associated with a high rank on another variable. Like many other measures of association, it varies between +1.0 and -1.0, with zero indicating the absence of a relationship.

TABLE 10.3.--Tau Betas Measuring the Degree of Association of Democratic Attitudes with Selected Variables in Five Countries

Association Between Democratic Attitudes and:	United Kingdom	United States	Germany	Italy	Mexico	Five Countries
Income	.097	.164	.019	.082	.054	.143
Education	.156	.217	.058	.161	.086	.198
Community Size	-.017	.027	-.051	-.077	.063	-.026
Socialization	.142	.166	.048	.022	.139	.155
Trust	.177	.430	.111	.101	.086	.190

Table 10.3 is a matrix of correlations of democratic attitudes and the five variables discussed in these exercises.

8) Which variables show the highest and lowest degrees of association? How would you describe the relationships generally? ____________________

____

____

____

____

____

____

9) What explanations can you suggest for the pattern of relationships found in the Table? What reasons might account for the generally low degree of association among most of the variables in the Table? ____________________

____

____

____

____

____

Comparative Politics Laboratory

LABORATORY DECK

Almond - Verba Five Nation Study

Column Number	Page in Manual	Code
		United Kingdom Data
1	5	United Kingdom - Democratic Attitudes Index
2	6	United Kingdom - Subjective Competence Index
3	7	United Kingdom - Socialization Index
4	8	United Kingdom - Trust Index
5	9	United Kingdom - Organizational Participation
6	9	United Kingdom - Knowledge of Public Officials
7	10	United Kingdom - Political Party Preference
8	10	United Kingdom - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs
9	11	United Kingdom - Pride in Country
10	12	United Kingdom - Work Situation
11	13	United Kingdom - Education
12	13	United Kingdom - Community Size
13	13	United Kingdom - Income
14	14	United Kingdom - Occupation of Respondent
15	14	United Kingdom - Age
16	14	United Kingdom - Region
		United States Data
17	15	United States - Democratic Attitudes Index
18	16	United States - Subjective Competence Index
19	17	United States - Socialization Index

Column Number	Page in Manual	Code
20	18	United States - Trust Index
21	19	United States - Organizational Participation
22	19	United States - Knowledge of Public Officials
23	20	United States - Political Party Preference
24	20	United States - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs
25	21	United States - Pride in Country
26	22	United States - Work Situation
27	23	United States - Education
28	23	United States - Community Size
29	23	United States - Income
30	24	United States - Occupation of Respondent
31	24	United States - Age
32	24	United States - Region
		German Data
33	25	Germany - Democratic Attitudes Index
34	26	Germany - Subjective Competence Index
35	27	Germany - Socialization Index
36	28	Germany - Trust Index
37	29	Germany - Organizational Participation
38	29	Germany - Knowledge of Public Officials
39	30	Germany - Political Party Preference
40	30	Germany - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs
41	31	Germany - Pride in Country
42	32	Germany - Work Situation

Column Number	Page in Manual	Code
43	33	Germany - Education
44	33	Germany - Community Size
45	33	Germany - Income
46	34	Germany - Occupation of Respondent
47	34	Germany - Age
48	34	Germany - Region
		Italian Data
49	35	Italy - Democratic Attitudes Index
50	36	Italy - Subjective Competence Index
51	37	Italy - Socialization Index
52	38	Italy - Trust Index
53	39	Italy - Organizational Participation
54	39	Italy - Knowledge of Public Officials
55	40	Italy - Political Party Preference
56	40	Italy - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs
57	41	Italy - Pride in Country
58	42	Italy - Work Situation
59	43	Italy - Education
60	43	Italy - Community Size
61	43	Italy - Income
62	44	Italy - Occupation of Respondent
63	44	Italy - Age
64	44	Italy - Region
		Mexican Data
65	45	Mexico - Democratic Attitudes Index

Column Number	Page in Manual	Code
66	46	Mexico - Subjective Competence Index
67	47	Mexico - Socialization Index
68	48	Mexico - Trust Index
69	49	Mexico - Organizational Participation
70	49	Mexico - Knowledge of Public Officials
71	50	Mexico - Political Party Preference
72	50	Mexico - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs
73	51	Mexico - Pride in Country
74	52	Mexico - Work Situation
75	53	Mexico - Education
76	53	Mexico - Community Size
77	53	Mexico - Income
78	54	Mexico - Occupation of Respondent
79	54	Mexico - Age

Column Number   Code

1   United Kingdom--Democratic Attitudes Index

Based on responses to the following two questions:

> "Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think--is it needed or would we be better off without it?"

Needed - coded as a pro-democratic response

Better off without it - coded as an anti-democratic response

It depends, other, don't know - coded as No Answer

> "A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk." Do you agree or disagree?

Agree - coded as an anti-democratic response

Disagree - coded as a pro-democratic response

Other, don't know - coded as No Answer

Index code:

1. High - two pro-democratic responses
2. - one pro-democratic response and one No Answer
3. - one pro-democratic response and one anti-democratic response
4. - one anti-democratic response and one No Answer
5. Low - two anti-democratic responses
9. No answer - two no answer responses

Column Number | Code

2 | United Kingdom - Subjective Competence Scale

This is a reproduction of the subjective competence scale used in the analysis in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It represents respondents' scores on a Guttman Scale of the following five questions (in order of difficulty from easiest to most difficult):

> "Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them?"
>
> "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN, VILLAGE, ETC.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?"
>
> "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you *would* actually do something about it?"
>
> "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed?"
>
> "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?"

For a fuller explanation of the construction of this scale, see the footnote on pp. 231-236 of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963 (hardbound edition).

0. Low Subjective Competence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. High Subjective Competence
-. No Answer

Column Number **Code**

3 **United Kingdom--Socialization Index**

Based on responses to the following four questions:

> "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around 16, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself. Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?"
>
> "At around the same time, if a (family) decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining or was it better not to complain?"
>
> "In some schools the children are encouraged to discuss and debate political and social issues and to make up their own minds. How was it in your school—how much chance did the children have to express their opinions—a lot, some, or none at all?"
>
> "In some secondary schools the students participate in running school affairs—in others, the teachers decide everything. How was it in your school—did the students participate a great deal, some, very little, or not at all?

The socialization index was constructed by scoring individuals according to the number of experiences with the democratic process which they had had while growing up: (A no answer on one or two questions was counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High democratic socialization experience - 4 positive responses
2. - 3 positive responses
3. - 2 positive responses
4. - 1 positive response
5. No experience with the democratic process - No positive response
9. No answer on three or more questions.

Column Number	Code
4	**United Kingdom - Trust Index**

Based on the number of positive responses to the following four questions:

> "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" ("Most people can be trusted" is a positive response.)
>
> "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?" ("More inclined to help others" is a positive response.)
>
> "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)
>
> "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)

("Don't Know" and "No Answer" responses were counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High Trust (four positive responses)
2. (three positive responses)
3. (two positive responses)
4. (one positive response)
5. Low Trust (no positive responses)
9. Don't know or No Answer on three or more questions

Column Number   Code

5   **United Kingdom - Organizational Participation**

Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't know

6   **United Kingdom - Knowledge of Public Officials**

When a new Prime Minister comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are? (IF NEEDED) Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT NAMES FIVE CABINET POSITIONS OR UNTIL RESPONDENT KNOWS NO MORE. CODE IN TERMS OF NUMBER CORRECT. ACCEPT AS CORRECT EITHER NAME OF CABINET POSITION SUCH AS "CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER" OR "FOREIGN SECRETARY," OR NAME OF THE MINISTRY SUCH AS "TREASURY" OR "FOREIGN OFFICE.")

6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct; don't know
+. Other

Column Number **Code**

7 **United Kingdom - Political Party Preference**

Based on following questions:

"Now we would like to find out something about your party preference and how you vote. Are you currently a member of any political party or organization?"

"Do you consider yourself a supporter of any particular political party?"

"Towards which political party do you lean?"

1. Active Labourites - members of Labour Party
2. Non-active Labourites - others who support or lean toward the Labour Party
3. Active Conservatives - members of Conservative Party
4. Non-active Conservatives - others who support or lean toward the Conservative Party
5. Active Liberals - members of the Liberal Party
6. Non-active Liberals - others who support or lean toward the Liberal Party
7. Other parties
8. No party
9. Don't know

+. Refused to say

8 **United Kingdom - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs**

Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know

Column Number   Code

9   United Kingdom - Pride in Country

Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as an Englishman?

(Respondents could mention several things they were proud of about their country. In this code, priority was given to mentions of the political-legal system and the economic system, as defined in codes 1 and 2. Therefore, if a respondent mentioned either or both of these, he was coded as a 1, 2, or 3, even though he might also have mentioned other aspects of the country included in codes 4 and 5. Second priority was given to other policy related items—these respondents (code 4) might have mentioned topics included in code 5, but did not mention either the political-legal or economic systems.)

1. Political-legal system: freedoms, democracy, justice, political stability, peace

2. Economic system: economic growth, chance to advance, earn a living, industrial progress

3. Both political-legal system and economic system

4. Other things related to governmental policies - social legislation or national strength and independence; (no mention of 1 or 2 above)

5. Other aspects of country: contributions to science or culture, spiritual values, characteristics of people or physical attributes of country; (no mention of 1, 2, or 4 above)

0. Nothing

-. Don't know, No answer

Column Number	Code
10	United Kingdom - Work Situation

Based on the following two questions:

> "We'd like to find out how decisions are made on your job. When decisions are made affecting your own work, do those in authority ever you ever consult you about them? Do they *usually* consult you, do they *sometimes* consult you, does this happen rarely or are you never consulted?" ("usually" and "sometimes consulted" are positive responses)
>
> "If a decision were made affecting your own work that you disagreed with strongly, what would you do—would you feel *free* to complain, would you feel *uneasy* about complaining, or is it better to accept the decision and not complain?" ("feel free to complain" is a positive response)

1. High influence in decision-making on job - two positive responses

2. Medium influence in decision-making on job - one positive response

3. Low influence in decision-making on job - no positive response

9. Inappropriate - Respondent is unemployed or has no one in authority over him on job

-\. No Answer or don't know to one or both questions

Column Number	Code
11	**United Kingdom - Education**

We would like to find out something about your education. How far did you get with your education? (PROBE TO FIND HIGHEST LEVEL ATTAINED)

7. No schooling--none at all
8. Primary school
9. Secondary school
0. University
-. Other ('Technical College' and 'Teachers Training College')
+. Don't know

Column Number	Code
12	**United Kingdom - Community Size**

Size of town where interview takes place

8. Less than 5,000
9. 5,000 - 20,000
0. 20,000 - 50,000
-. 50,000 - 100,000
+. 100,000 and over

Column Number	Code
13	**United Kingdom - Income**

Could you please place your family income in one of the following income groups. (HAND LIST 11)

4. Under £ 300.....
5. £300 - £650.....
6. £650 - £1,000...
7. £1,000 - £1,500.
8. £1,500 - £2,000.
9. £2,000 - £3,000.
0. £3,000 + ...
+. Don't know--refuse to answer

Column Number	Code
14	**United Kingdom - Occupation of Respondent** 1. Professional, higher management, big business 2. Small business (owner, partner) 3. White collar worker 4. Skilled worker, artisan 5. Unskilled worker, domestic servant 6. Farmer (landowner) 7. Farm worker, tenant 8. Housewife 9. Retired 0. Student +. Unemployed -. No answer
15	**United Kingdom - Age** How old are you? 6. 18 - 25 7. 26 - 30 8. 31 - 35 9. 36 - 40 0. 41 - 50 -. 51 - 60 +. 60 and over
16	**United Kingdom - Region of Country** 8. S. England 9. Wales 0. The Midlands -. N. England +. Scotland

Column Number **Code**

17 **United States - Democratic Attitudes Index**

Based on responses to the following two questions:

> "Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think —is it needed or would we be better off without it?"

Needed - coded as a pro-democratic response

Better off without it - coded as an anti-democratic response

It depends, other, don't know - coded as No Answer

> "A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk." Do you agree or disagree?

Agree - coded as an anti-democratic response

Disagree - coded as a pro-democratic response

Other, don't know - coded as No Answer

Index code:

1. High - two pro-democratic responses
2. - one pro-democratic response and one No Answer
3. - one pro-democratic response and one anti-democratic response
4. - one anti-democratic response and one No Answer
5. Low - two anti-democratic responses
9. No answer - two no answer responses

Column Number **Code**

18 **United States - Subjective Competence Scale**

This is a reproduction of the subjective competence scale used in the analysis in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It represents respondents' scores on a Guttman Scale of the following five questions (in order of difficulty from easiest to most difficult):

> "Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them?
>
> "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN, VILLAGE, ETC.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?"
>
> "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually do something about it?"
>
> "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed?"
>
> "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?"

For a fuller explanation of the construction of this scale, see the footnote on pp. 231-236 of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963 (hardbound edition).

0. Low Subjective Competence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. High Subjective Competence
-. No Answer

Column Number	Code
19	United States - Socialization Index

Based on responses to the following four questions:

> "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around 16, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself. Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?"
>
> "At around the same time, if a (family) decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining or was it better not to complain?"
>
> "In some schools the children are encouraged to discuss and debate political and social issues and to make up their own minds. How was it in your school—how much chance did the children have to express their opinions—a lot, some or none at all?"
>
> "In some secondary schools the students participate in running school affairs—in others, the teachers decide everything. How was it in your school—did the students participate a great deal, some, very little, or not at all?"

The socialization index was constructed by scoring individuals according to the number of experiences with the democratic process which they had had while growing up: (A no answer on one or two questions was counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High democratic socialization experience - 4 positive responses

2. - 3 positive responses

3. - 2 positive responses

4. - 1 positive response

5. No experience with the democratic process - No positive response

9. No answer on three or more questions

Column Number | **Code**

20 | **United States - Trust Index**

Based on the number of positive responses to the following four questions:

> "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" ("Most people can be trusted" is a positive response.)
>
> "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?" ("More inclined to help others" is a positive response.)
>
> "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)
>
> "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)

("Don't Know" and No Answer" responses were counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High Trust (four positive responses)
2. (three positive responses)
3. (two positive responses)
4. (one positive response)
5. Low Trust (no positive responses)
9. Don't Know or No Answer on three or more questions

Column Number **Code**

21 **United States - Organizational Participation**

Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): "Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s))?"

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't know

22 **United States - Knowledge of Public Officials**

When a new President comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are? Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT KNOWS NO MORE. CODE IN TERMS OF NUMBER CORRECT. ACCEPT AS CORRECT EITHER NAME OF CABINET POSITION SUCH AS "SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY" OR NAME OF DEPARTMENT SUCH AS "TREASURY" OR "STATE".)

6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct; don't know
+. Other

Column Number | Code

23 **United States - Political Party Preference**

Based on the following questions:

"Now we would like to know something about your party preference and how you vote. Do you consider yourself a supporter of a particular political party? (Which party?) (IF NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN "SUPPORTER" SAY: Do you think of yourself generally as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent or what?)"

(If Respondent does not support a party): "Toward which party do you lean?"

(If Respondent supports or leans toward a party): "Are you a member of any political club or organization? (Which club or organization is that?)"

"Have you ever been active in a political campaign—that is, have you worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?"

1. Active Democrats - members of Democratic clubs or organizations and Democratic supporters who have been active in campaigns
2. Non-active Democrats - others who support or lean toward the Democratic party
3. Active Republicans - members of Republican clubs or organizations and Republican supporters who have been active in campaigns
4. Non-active Republicans - others who support or lean toward the Republican party
7. Other party
8. No party
9. Don't know, no answer

24 **United States - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs**

Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know; NA

Column Number **Code**

25 **United States - Pride in Country**

Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as an American?

(Respondents could mention several things they were proud of about their country. In this code, priority was given to mentions of the political-legal system and the economic system, as defined in codes 1 and 2. Therefore, if a respondent mentioned either or both of these, he was coded as a 1, 2, or 3, even though he might also have mentioned other aspects of the country included in codes 4 and 5. Second priority was given to other policy related items - these respondents (code 4) might have mentioned topics included in code 5, but did not mention either the political-legal or economic systems.)

1. Political-legal system: freedoms, democracy, justice, political stability. peace

2. Economic system: economic growth, chance to advance, earn a living, industrial progress

3. Both political-legal system and economic system

4. Other things related to governmental policies - social legislation or national strength and independence; (no mention of 1 or 2 above)

5. Other aspects of country: contributions to science or culture, spiritual values, characteristics of people or physical attributes of country; (no mention of 1, 2, or 4 above)

0. Nothing

-. Don't know, No answer

Column Number   Code

26   United States - Work Situation

Based on the following two question:

> "We'd like to find out how decisions are made on your job. When decisions are made affecting your own work, do those in authority over you ever consult you about them? Do they usually consult you, do they sometimes consult you, does this happen rarely or are you never consulted?" ("usually" and "sometimes consulted" are positive responses)

> "If a decision were made affecting your own work that you disagreed with strongly, what would you do—would you feel free to complain, would you feel uneasy about complaining, or is it better to accept the decision and not complain?" ("feel free to complain" is a positive response)

1. High influence in decision-making on job - two positive responses

2. Medium influence in decision-making on job - one positive response

3. Low influence in decision-making on job - no positive response

9. Inappropriate - Respondent is unemployed or has no one in authority over him on job

-. No Answer or don't know to one or both questions

Column Number **Code**

27 **United States - Education**

We would like to find out something about your education. How far did you get with your education? (PROBE TO FIND HIGHEST LEVEL ATTAINED)

0. No schooling
1. One - four years
2. Five - seven years
3. Eight years
4. Nine - eleven years
5. Twelve years
6. One - three college
7. College graduate

28 **United States - Community Size**

Size of town where interview takes place

7. Less than 5,000
8. 5,000 - 10,000
9. 10,000 - 20,000
0. 20,000 - 50,000
-. 50,000 - 100,000
+. 100,000 and over

29 **United States - Income**

And my last question is about family income. Adding together the whole family income, as well as any other money the family here may have received from pensions, unemployment compensation, or other sources—in which one of these general groups did the total income of your family fall during the last twelve months—before taxes, that is? (HAND RESPONDENT BLUE CARD)

4. Under $1,000
5. $1,000 - $1,999
6. $2,000 - $2,999
7. $3,000 - $4,999
8. $5,000 - $7,499
9. $7,500 - $9,999
0. $10,000 - $14,999
-. $15,000 and over
+. Don't know - refuse to answer; NA

Column Number **Code**

30 **United States - Occupation of Respondent**

1. Professional, higher management
2. Proprietors
3. White collar worker
4. Skilled worker, foreman, operative & kindred, service worker
5. Unskilled worker, private household worker
6. Farm owner, tenant, sharecropper
7. Farm laborer
8. Housewife
9. Retired, disabled
0. Student
+. Unemployed
-. No answer

31 **United States - Age**

How old are you?

5. NA
6. 18 - 25
7. 26 - 30
8. 31 - 35
9. 36 - 40
0. 41 - 50
-. 51 - 60
+. 60 and over

32 **United States - Region of Country**

1. New England States
2. Middle Atlantic States
3. South Atlantic (Including D.C.)
4. East South Central States
5. East North Central States
6. West North Central States
7. West South Central States
8. Mountain States
9. Pacific States

Column Number **Code**

33 **Germany - Democratic Attitudes Index**

Based on responses to the following two questions:

> "Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think —is it needed or would we be better off without it?"
>
> Needed - coded as a pro-democratic response
>
> Better off without it - coded as an anti-democratic response
>
> It depends, other, don't know - coded as No Answer
>
> "A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk." Do you agree or disagree?
>
> Agree - coded as an anti-democratic response
>
> Disagree - coded as a pro-democratic response
>
> Other, don't know - coded as No Answer

Index code:

1. High - two pro-democratic responses
2. - one pro-democratic response and one No Answer
3. - one pro-democratic response and one anti-democratic response
4. - one anti-democratic response and one No Answer
5. Low - two anti-democratic responses

9. No answer - two no answer responses

Column Number	Code
34	Germany - Subjective Competence Scale

This is a reproduction of the subjective competence scale used in the analysis in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It represents respondents' scores on a Guttman Scale of the following five questions (in order of difficulty from easiest to most difficult):

> "Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them?"
>
> "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN, VILLAGE, ETC.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?"
>
> "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually do something about it?"
>
> "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed?"
>
> "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?"

For a fuller explanation of the construction of this scale, see the footnote on pp. 231-236 of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963 (hardbound edition.)

0. Low Subjective Competence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. High Subjective Competence
-. No Answer

Column Number — Code

35 — Germany - Socialization Index

Based on responses to the following four questions:

> "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around 16, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself. Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?"
>
> "At around the same time, if a (family) decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining or was it better not to complain?"
>
> "In some schools the children are encouraged to discuss and debate political and social issues and to make up their own minds. How was it in your school—how much chance did the children have to express their opinions —a lot, some, or none at all?"
>
> "In some secondary schools the students participate in running school affairs—in others, the teachers decide everything. How was it in your school—did the students participate a great deal, some, very little, or not at all?"

The socialization index was constructed by scoring individuals according to the number of experiences with the democratic process which they had had while growing up: (A no answer on one or two questions was counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High democratic socialization experience - 4 positive responses
2. - 3 positive responses
3. - 2 positive responses
4. - 1 positive response
5. No experience with the democratic process - No positive response
9. No answer on three or more questions

Column Number   Code

36   Germany - Trust Index

Based on the number of positive responses to the following four questions:

> "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" ("Most people can be trusted" is a positive response.)
>
> "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?" ("More inclined to help others" is a positive response.)
>
> "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)
>
> "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)

("Don't Know" and "No Answer" responses were counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High Trust (four positive responses)
2. (three positive responses)
3. (two positive responses)
4. (one positive response)
5. Low Trust (no positive responses)
9. Don't know or No Answer on three or more questions

Column Number **Code**

37 **Germany - Organizational Participation**

Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): "Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?"

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't Know

38 **Germany - Knowledge of Public Officials**

When a new Chancellor comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are? (IF NEEDED) Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT NAMES FIVE CABINET POSITIONS OR UNTIL RESPONDENT KNOWS NO MORE. CODE IN TERMS OF NUMBER CORRECT. ACCEPT AS CORRECT EITHER NAME OF CABINET POSITION SUCH AS "CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER" OR "FOREIGN SECRETARY," OR NAME OF THE MINISTRY SUCH AS "TREASURY" OR "FOREIGN OFFICE.")

6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct. Don't know
+. Other

Column Number **Code**

39 **Germany - Political Party Preference**

Based on the following questions:

"Now we would like to find out something about your party preference and how you vote. Are you currently a member of any political party or organization?"

"Do you consider yourself a supporter of any particular political party?"

1. Active SPD - members of SPD
2. Non-active SPD - other supporters of SPD
3. Active CDU/CSU - members of CDU/CSU
4. Non-active CDU/CSU - other supporters of CDU/CSU
5. FDP - members and supporters of FDP
6. DP - members and supporters of DP
7. Other parties
8. No party
9. Don't know

+. Refused to say

40 **Germany - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs**

Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know

Column Number **Code**

41 **Germany - Pride in Country**

Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as a German?

(Respondents could mention several things they were proud of about their country. In this code, priority was given to mentions of the political-legal system and the economic system, as defined in codes 1 and 2. Therefore, if a respondent mentioned either or both of these, he was coded as a 1, 2, or 3, even though he might also have mentioned other aspects of the country included in codes 4 and 5. Second priority was given to other policy related items - these respondents (code 4) might have mentioned topics included in code 5, but did not mention either the political-legal or economic systems.)

1. Political-legal system: freedoms, democracy, justice, political stability, peace

2. Economic system: economic growth, chance to advance, earn a living, industrial progress

3. Both political-legal system and economic system

4. Other things related to governmental policies - social legislation or national strength and independence; (no mention of 1 or 2 above)

5. Other aspects of country: contributions to science and culture, spiritual values, characteristics of people or physical attributes of country; (no mention of 1, 2, or 4 above)

0. Nothing

-. Don't know, No answer

Column Number **Code**

42 **Germany - Work Situation**

Based on the following two questions:

> "We'd like to find out how decisions are made on your job. When decisions are made affecting your own work, do those in authority over you ever consult you about them? Do they *usually* consult you, do they *sometimes* consult you, does this happen rarely or are you never consulted?" ("usually" and "sometimes consulted" are positive responses)
>
> "If a decision were made affecting your own work that you disagreed with strongly, what would you do--would you feel *free* to complain, would you feel *uneasy* about complaining, or is it better to accept the decision and not complain?" ("feel free to complain" is a positive response)

1. High influence in decision-making on job - two positive responses

2. Medium influence in decision-making on job - one positive response

3. Low influence in decision-making on job - no positive response

9. Inappropriate - Respondent is unemployed or has no one in authority over him on job

-\. No Answer or don't know to one or both questions

Column Number **Code**

43 **Germany - Education**

We would like to find out something about your education. How far did you get with your education? (PROBE TO FIND HIGHEST LEVEL ATTAINED)

7. No schooling--none at all
8. Primary school
9. Secondary school
0. University
-. Other
+. Don't know

44 **Germany - Community Size**

Size of town where interview takes place

8. Less than 5,000
9. 5,000 - 20,000
0. 20,000 - 50,000
-. 50,000 - 100,000
+. 100,000 and over

45 **Germany - Income**

KÖnnen Sie bitte Ihr monatliches Familieneinkommen anhand der folgenden Einkommensgruppierung angeben? (KARTE)

4. A bis unter 150 DM
5. B 150 bis unter 250 DM
6. C 250 bis unter 350 DM
7. D 350 bis unter 500 DM
8. E 500 bis unter 750 DM
9. F 750 bis unter 1000DM
0. G 1000 bis unter 1500DM
-. H 1500 DM und mehr
+. Weiss nicht/Angabe verweigert

Column Number **Code**

46 **Germany - Occupation of Respondent**

1. Professional, higher management, Beamte
2. Small business (owner, partner)
3. White collar worker
4. Skilled worker, artisan
5. Unskilled worker, domestic worker
6. Farm owner
7. Farm worker
8. Housewife
9. Retired
0. Student
+. Unemployed
-. Other

47 **Germany - Age**

How old are you? (RECORD EXACT AGE AND CODE)

6. 18 - 25
7. 26 - 30
8. 31 - 35
9. 36 - 40
0. 41 - 50
-. 51 - 60
+. 60 and over

48 **Germany - Region of Country**

8. Schleswig-Holstein - Lower Saxony
9. Northern Rhine, Westphalia, Rhineland - Palatinate
0. Hesse - Baden-Wuertenberg
-. Bavaria
+. Hamburg - Bremen

Column Number	Code
49	**Italy - Democratic Attitudes Index**

Based on responses to the following two questions:

> "Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think —is it needed or would we be better off without it?"

Needed - coded as a pro-democratic response

Better off without it - coded as an anti-democratic response

It depends, other, don't know - coded as No Answer

> "A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk." Do you agree or disagree?

Agree - coded as an anti-democratic response

Disagree - coded as a pro-democratic response

Other, don't know - coded as No Answer

Index code:

1. High - two pro-democratic responses
2. - one pro-democratic response and one No Answer
3. - one pro-democratic response and one anti-democratic response
4. - one anti-democratic response and one No Answer
5. Low - two anti-democratic responses
9. No answer - two no answer responses

Column Number **Code**

50 **Italy - Subjective Competence Scale**

This is a reproduction of the subjective competence scale used in the analysis in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. It represents respondents' scores on a Guttman Scale of the following five questions (in order of difficulty from easiest to most difficult):

> "Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them?"

> "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN, VILLAGE, ETC.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?"

> "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you *would* actually do something about it?"

> "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed?"

> "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?"

For a fuller explanation of the construction of this scale, see the footnote on pp. 231-236 of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963 (hardbound edition.)

0. Low Subjective Competence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5. High Subjective Competence
-. No Answer

Column Number	Code
51	Italy - Socialization Index

Based on responses to the following four questions:

> "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around 16, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself. Did you have much influence, some, or none at all?
>
> "At around the same time, if a (family) decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining or was it better not to complain?"
>
> "In some schools the children are encouraged to discuss and debate political and social issues and to make up their own minds. How was it in your school—how much chance did the children have to express their opinions —a lot, some or none at all?"
>
> "In some secondary schools the students participate in running school affairs—in others, the teachers decide everything. How was it in your school—did the students participate a great deal, some, very little, or not at all?"

The socialization index was constructed by scoring individuals according to the number of experiences with the democratic process which they had had while growing up: (A no answer on one or two questions was counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High democratic socialization experience - 4 positive responses
2. - 3 positive responses
3. - 2 positive responses
4. - 1 positive response
5. No experience with the democratic process - No positive response
9. No answer on three or more questions

Column Number	Code
52	Italy - Trust Index

Based on the number of positive responses to the following four questions:

> "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" ("Most people can be trusted" is a positive response.)
>
> "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?" ("More inclined to help others" is a positive response.)
>
> "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)
>
> "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)

("Don't Know" and "No Answer" responses were counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High Trust (four positive responses)
2. (three positive responses)
3. (two positive responses)
4. (one positive response)
5. Low Trust (no positive responses)
9. Don't know or No Answer on three or more questions

Column Number **Code**

53 **Italy - Organizational Participation**

Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): "Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?"

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't Know

54 **Italy - Knowledge of Public Officials**

When a new Prime Minister comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are? (IF NEEDED) Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT NAMES FIVE CABINET POSITIONS OR UNTIL RESPONDENT KNOWS NO MORE. CODE IN TERMS OF NUMBER CORRECT. ACCEPT AS CORRECT EITHER NAME OF CABINET POSITION SUCH AS "CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER" OR "FOREIGN SECRETARY," OR NAME OF THE MINISTRY SUCH AS "TREASURY" OR "FOREIGN OFFICE.")

6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct. Don't know
+. Other

Column Number **Code**

55 **Italy - Political Party Preference**

Based on following questions:

"Now we would like to find out something about your party preference and how you vote. Are you currently a member of any political party or organization?"

"Do you consider yourself a supporter of any particular political party?"

"Toward which political party do you lean?"

1. Active PSI - member of PSI
2. Non-active PSI - others who support or lean toward PSI
3. Active DC - members of DC
4. Non-active DC - others who support or lean toward DC
5. Active PCI - members of PCI
6. Non-active PCI - others who support or lean toward PCI
7. PSDI - members, supporters and those who lean toward PSDI
8. PLI - members, supporters and those who lean toward PLI
9. MSI - members, supporters and those who lean toward MSI

+. PRI, MON, other parties
0. No party
-. Don't know

56 **Italy - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs**

Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know
9. NA

Column Number   Code

57   Italy - Pride in Country

Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as an Italian?

(Respondents could mention several things they were proud of about their country. In this code, priority was given to mentions of the political-legal system and the economic system, as defined in codes 1 and 2. Therefore, if a respondent mentioned either or both of these, he was coded as a 1, 2, or 3, even though he might also have mentioned other aspects of the country included in codes 4 and 5. Second priority was given to other policy related items - these respondents (code 4) might have mentioned topics included in code 5, but did not mention either the political-legal or economic systems.)

1. Political-legal system: freedoms, democracy, justice, political stability, peace

2. Economic system: economic growth, chance to advance, earn a living, industrial progress

3. Both political-legal system and economic system

4. Other things related to governmental policies - social legislation or national strength and independence; (no mention of 1 or 2 above)

5. Other aspects of country: contributions to science or culture, spiritual values, characteristics of people or physical attributes of country; (no mention of 1, 2, or 4 above)

0. Nothing

-. Don't know, No answer

Column Number	Code
58	**Italy - Work Situation**

Based on the following two questions:

> "We'd like to find out how decisions are made on your job. When decisions are made affecting your own work, do those in authority over you ever consult you about them? Do they *usually* consult you, do they *sometimes* consult you, does this happen rarely or are you never consulted?" ("usually" and "sometimes consulted" are positive responses)
>
> "If a decision were made affecting your own work that you disagreed with strongly, what would you do—would you feel *free* to complain, would you feel *uneasy* about complaining, or is it better to accept the decision and not complain?" ("feel free to complain" is a positive response)

1. High influence in decision-making on job - two positive responses

2. Medium influence in decision-making on job - one positive response

3. Low influence in decision-making on job - no positive response

9. Inappropriate - Respondent is unemployed or has no one in authority over him on job

-. No Answer or don't know to one or both questions

Column Number — Code

59 — Italy - Education

We would like to find out something about your education. How far did you get with your education? (PROBE TO FIND HIGHEST LEVEL ATTAINED)

6. None
7. Elementary
8. Junior High
9. Senior High
0. University
-. Other
+. Don't know

60 — Italy - Community Size

Size of town where interview takes place

8. Less than 5,000
9. 5,000 - 20,000
0. 20,000 - 50,000
-. 50,000 - 100,000
+. 100,000 and over

61 — Italy - Income

Potrebbe infine indicarmi in quale di queste categorie (mostrare lista 11) rientra il reddito complessivo annuo della sua famiglia?

4. meno di 200.000 Lire
5. 200.000 - 399.999 Lire
6. 400.00 - 699.999 Lire
7. 700.00 - 999.999 Lire
8. 1.000.000 - 1.499.999 Lire
9. 1.500.000 - 2.499.999 Lire
0. 2.500.000 - 4.999.999 Lire
-. 5.000.000 o più
+. non so, rifiuto a rispondere

Column Number **Code**

62 **Italy - Occupation of Respondent**

1. Professional, higher management, big business
2. Small business (owner, partner)
3. White collar worker
4. Skilled worker, artisan
5. Unskilled worker, domestic servant
6. Farm owner
7. Farm worker, tenant
8. Housewife
9. Retired
0. Student
+. Unemployed
-. No answer—no occupation

63 **Italy - Age**

How old are you? (RECORD EXACT AGE AND CODE)

6. 18 - 25
7. 26 - 30
8. 31 - 35
9. 36 - 40
0. 41 - 50
-. 51 - 60
+. 60 and over

64 **Italy - Region of Country**

9. North
0. Center
-. South
+. Islands

Column Number | Code

65 Mexico - Democratic Attitudes Index

Based on responses to the following two questions:

> "Some people feel that campaigning is needed so the public can judge candidates and issues. Others say that it causes so much bitterness and is so unreliable that we'd be better off without it. What do you think —is it needed or would we be better off without it?"
>
> Needed - coded as a pro-democratic response
>
> Better off without it - coded as an anti-democratic response
>
> It depends, other, don't know - coded as No Answer
>
> "A few strong leaders would do more for this country than all the laws and talk." Do you agree or disagree?
>
> Agree - coded as an anti-democratic response
>
> Disagree - coded as a pro-democratic response
>
> Other, don't know - coded as No Answer

Index code:

1. High - two pro-democratic responses
2. - one pro-democratic response and one No Answer
3. - one pro-democratic response and one anti-democratic response
4. - one anti-democratic response and one No Answer
5. Low - two anti-democratic responses
9. No answer - two no answer responses

Column Number **Code**

66 **Mexico - Subjective Competence Index**

This is a reproduction of the subjective competence scale used in the analysis in The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba. In the case of Mexico, Guttman Scale scores were not used; instead, Mexican respondents were scored according to the number of positive responses made to the following five questions:

> "Some people say that politics and government are so complicated that the average man cannot really understand what is going on. How about local issues in this town or part of the country. How well do you understand them?"
>
> "Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN, VILLAGE, ETC.) which you considered very unjust or harmful, what do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?"
>
> (IF RESPONDENT SAYS HE COULD DO SOMETHING) "If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actually do something?"
>
> "If you made an effort to change this regulation how likely is it that you would succeed?"
>
> "Have you ever done anything to try to influence a local decision?"

For a fuller explanation of the construction of this index, see the footnote on pp. 231-236 of Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Princeton University Press, 1963 (hardbound edition.)

0.	Low Subjective Competence	(no positive responses)
1.		(one positive response)
2.		(two positive responses)
3.		(three positive responses)
4.		(four positive responses)
5.	High Subjective Competence	(five positive responses)
-.	No Answer	

Column Number Code

67 Mexico - Socialization Index

Based on responses to the following four questions:

> "As you were growing up, let's say when you were around 16, how much influence do you remember having in family decisions affecting yourself. Did you have much influence, Some, or none at all?"
>
> "At around the same time, if a (family) decision were made that you didn't like, did you feel free to complain, did you feel a little uneasy about complaining or was it better not to complain?"
>
> "In some schools the children are encouraged to discuss and debate political and social issues and to make up their own minds. How was it in your school—how much chance did the children have to express their opinions —a lot, some, or none at all?"
>
> "In some secondary schools the students participate in running school affairs—in others, the teachers decide everything. How was it in your school—did the students participate a great deal, some, very little, or not at all?"

The socialization index was constructed by scoring individuals according to the number of experiences with the democratic process which they had had while growing up: (A no answer on one or two questions was counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High democratic socialization experience - 4 positive responses
2. - 3 positive responses
3. - 2 positive responses
4. - 1 positive response
5. No experience with the democratic process - No positive response
9. No answer on three or more questions

Column Number **Code**

68 **Mexico - Trust Index**

Based on the number of positive responses to the following four questions:

> "Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?" ("Most people can be trusted" is a positive response.)
>
> "Speaking generally, would you say that most people are more inclined to help others, or more inclined to look out for themselves?" ("More inclined to help others" is a positive response.)
>
> "If you don't watch yourself, people will take advantage of you. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)
>
> "No one is going to care much what happens to you, when you get right down to it. Do you agree or disagree with that?" ("Disagree" is a positive response.)

("Don't Know" and "No Answer" responses were counted as one-half positive response, with rounding toward the extreme categories.)

1. High Trust (four positive responses)
2. (three positive responses)
3. (two positive responses)
4. (one positive response)
5. Low Trust (no positive responses)
9. Don't know or No Answer on three or more questions

Column Number	Code
69	**Mexico - Organizational Participation**

"Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?"

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): "Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?"

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't know

Column Number	Code
70	**Mexico - Knowledge of Public Officials**

When a new President comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are? (IF NEEDED) Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT NAMES FIVE CABINET POSITIONS OR UNTIL RESPONDENT KNOWS NO MORE. CODE IN TERMS OF NUMBER CORRECT. ACCEPT AS CORRECT EITHER NAME OF CABINET POSITION SUCH AS "CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER" OR "FOREIGN SECRETARY," OR NAME OF THE MINISTRY SUCH AS "TREASURY" OR "FOREIGN OFFICE.")

6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct
+. Don't know; NA

Column Number   Code

69 Mexico - Organizational Participation

"Are you a member of any organizations now—trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veteran's groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic or religious organizations—or any other organized group? (IF NEEDED) Which ones?"

(IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION NOW): "Have you ever been an officer in this (one of these) organization(s)?"

1. Belongs to one organization and has been an officer
2. Belongs to two organizations and has been an officer
3. Belongs to three organizations and has been an officer
4. Belongs to four or more organizations and has been an officer

5. Belongs to one organization and has never been an officer
6. Belongs to two organizations and has never been an officer
7. Belongs to three organizations and has never been an officer
8. Belongs to four or more organizations and has never been an officer

0. Belongs to no organizations
-. No Answer, Don't know

70 Mexico - Knowledge of Public Officials

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6. One correct
7. Two correct
8. Three correct
9. Four correct
0. Five or more correct
-. None named or none correct
+. Don't know; NA

Column Number **Code**

71 Mexico - Political Party Preference

Based on the following questions:

"Now we would like to find out something about your party preference and how you vote. Are you currently a member of any political party or organization?"

"Do you consider yourself a supporter of any particular political party?"

"Toward which political party do you lean?"

1. Active PRI - members of PRI
2. Non-active PRI - others who support or lean toward PRI
3. Active PAN - members of PAN
4. Non-active PAN - others who support or lean toward PAN
5. Active PP - members of PP
6. Non-active PP - others who support or lean toward PP
7. Other party
8. No party
9. Don't know

+. Refused to say

72 Mexico - Attention to Political and Governmental Affairs

Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs; would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

1. Regularly
2. From time to time
3. Other
4. Never
5. Don't know

Column Number | Code

73 | Mexico - Pride in Country

Speaking generally, what are the things about this country that you are most proud of as a Mexican?

(Respondents could mention several things they were proud of about their country. In this code, priority was given to mentions of the political-legal system and the economic system, as defined in codes 1 and 2. Therefore, if a respondent mentioned either or both of these, he was coded as a 1, 2, or 3, even though he might also have mentioned other aspects of the country included in codes 4 and 5. Second priority was given to other policy related items - these respondents (code 4) might have mentioned topics included in code 5, but did not mention either the political-legal or economic systems.)

1. Political-legal system: freedoms, democracy, justice, political stability, peace

2. Economic system: economic growth, chance to advance, earn a living, industrial progress

3. Both political-legal system and economic system

4. Other things related to governmental policies - social legislation or national strength and independence; (no mention of 1 or 2 above)

5. Other aspects of country: contributions to science or culture, spiritual values, characteristics of people or physical attributes of country; (no mention of 1, 2, or 4 above)

0. Nothing

-. Don't know, No answer

Column Number	Code

74

Mexico - Work Situation

Based on the following two questions:

> "We'd like to find out how decisions are made on your job. When decisions are made affecting your own work, do those in authority over you ever consult you about them? Do they *usually* consult you, do they *sometimes* consult you, does this happen rarely or are you never consulted?" ("usually" and "sometimes consulted" are positive responses)

> "If a decision were made affecting your own work that you disagreed with strongly, what would you do—would you feel *free* to complain, would you feel *uneasy* about complaining, or is it better to accept the decision and not complain?" ("feel free to complain" is a positive response)

1. High influence in decision-making on job - two positive responses

2. Medium influence in decision-making on job - one positive response

3. Low influence in decision-making on job - no positive response

9. Inappropriate - Respondent is unemployed or has no one in authority over him on job

-. No Answer or don't know to one or both questions

Column Number — Code

75 **Mexico - Education**

We would like to find out something about your education. How far did you get with your education? (PROBE TO FIND HIGHEST LEVEL ATTAINED)

7. No schooling--none at all
8. Primary school
9. Preparatory school; normal school
0. Advanced technological school
-. Other

+. No response

76 **Mexico - Community Size**

Size of town where interview takes place

9. 10,000 - 19,000
0. 20,000 - 49,999
-. 50,000 - 99,999
+. 100,000 and over

(Note that the Mexican Sample contains no respondents living in communities of less than 10,000 population.)

77 **Mexico - Income**

(ENSENAR TARJETA 11) Me haria usted el favor de clasificar los ingresos mensuales de la familia de usted en uno de los siguientes ocho grupos?

4. MENOS DE 500
5. 500 a 999
6. 1,000 a 1,499
7. 1,500 a 2,499
8. 2,500 a 4,999
9. 5,000 a 7,999
0. 8,000 a 12,999
-. 13,000 o MAS
+. No Sabe, Rehuso Clasificar

Column Number	Code
78	Mexico - Occupation of Respondent 1. Professional, higher management, big business 2. Small business (owner, partner) 3. White collar worker 4. Skilled worker, artisan 5. Unskilled worker, domestic servant 6. Farm owner 7. Farm worker, tenant 8. Housewife 9. Retired 0. Student +. Unemployed -. No answer, don't know
79	Mexico - Age How old are you? 6. 18 - 25 7. 26 - 30 8. 31 - 35 9. 36 - 40 0. 41 - 50 -. 51 - 50 +. 60 and over